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The United States needs to do considerably more to counter-
act Russia and China’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and South and East China Sea with sophisticated, multidimensional, 
multilateral, and ambitious efforts of its own.  By adopting a much 
more pro-active, comprehensive, and well-coordinated global energy 
security strategy embedded in a broad approach to human security1 
 
1 See generally BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1983) [hereinafter PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR]; 
BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS (1998); KEITH KRAUSE & MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES: 
CONCEPTS AND CASES (1997) [CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES]; Ken Booth, Beyond Critical 
Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS 268 (Ken Booth ed., 
2005); Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: 
Politics and Methods, 40 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 229 (1996).  Traditional security ap-
proaches towards threat are confined to centrally government controlled military threats.  
These methodologies have expanded to include threats that challenge economic and envi-
ronmental security and questions.  In depth security studies have pursued greater understand-
ing of the values within which security is embedded.  Some critical approaches – such as the 
collection produced by Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies – are deconstruction-
ist, in a tentative sense of unpacking and problematizing prevailing understandings of securi-
ty. See generally KRAUSE & WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES, supra.  They identify 
the limitations and contradictions of orthodox security studies and international relations 
theory and point the way to a better understanding of what security means. KRAUSE & 
WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES, supra.  Others propose a more coherent – and con-
sciously alternative – agenda.  However, beyond a common opposition to neorealism, the 
non-traditional and critical approaches to security often fundamentally diverge.  In particu-
lar, they differ on what the referent object of security should be, whether the objective 
should be to securitize or de-securitize (and the implications of this), and whether the em-
phasis should be on normative or explanatory theory.  Some non-traditional approaches re-
tain the state as the referent object of study, and broaden their analysis of the threats to the 
state, to include – for example – economic, societal, environmental, and political security 
challenges.  Barry Buzan’s landmark book, People, States and Fear, suggested that the indi-
vidual is the ‘irreducible base unit’ for explorations of security, but the referent of security 
must remain the state as it is the central actor in international politics and the principal agent 
for addressing insecurity. BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR, supra.  Other critical 
approaches challenge the state-centricity of security analysis fundamentally and argue that 
individuals or humans collectively should be the referent object of security.  For Booth: “A 
critical theory of security seeks to denaturalize and historicize all human-made political ref-
erents, recognizing only the primordial entity of the socially embedded individual.” Booth, 
Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS, su-
pra, at 268.  He continues: “The only transhistorical and permanent fixture in human society 
is the individual physical being, and so this must naturally be the ultimate referent in the se-
curity problematique.” Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY 
STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra, at 264. 
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and international law of the sea,2 allies together with other powers 
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the regions. 
America could complement the ambitions of regional pivotal 
or major powers by supporting international maritime law arbitration 
by becoming a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea [‘UNCLOS’].3  Such a move would give the United 
States greater credibility on the world stage4 providing more 
 
2 See D.C. KAPOOR & ADAM J. KERR, A GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 1-
10 (1986); TED L. MCDORMAN, ALEXANDER J. BOLLA, DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON & JOHN DUFF, 
INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARIES 16-20 (2005); LOUS B. SOHN 
& KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA, at xvii (1984).  “The law of the sea is an inte-
gral part of international law which has evolved over a period of five hundred years or more 
through customary and treaty law and the practice of States.” KAPOOR & KERR, supra, at 1.  
The history of the law of the sea has been one of balancing the conflicting interests of na-
tions with a primary interest in shipping (maritime states) and nations with interests based on 
security or resource uses of their adjacent waters (coastal states).  “There have been constant 
battles between the concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum through the history of the 
law of the sea.” SUN PYO KIM, MARITIME DELIMITATION AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN 
NORTH EAST ASIA 17 (2004).  At the beginning mare liberum seemed to have won the battle 
against mare clausum and the principle of freedom of seas applied virtually to all of the sea, 
namely the high sea beyond a narrow belt of water along the coastlines, called the territorial 
sea, which was under the sovereignty of a coastal State.  Freedom of navigation was the 
dominant custom in international sea law, subject to limited coastal state jurisdiction over 
waters adjacent to their shoreline.  However, since 1945, a movement to extend jurisdiction 
over the sea emerged, then mare clausum has been dominant, and “the trend clearly has been 
toward enclosing the ocean with ever broader coastal state claims of sovereignty or other 
competence to exclude other users of the oceans. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, 
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 3 (3d ed. 2012).  “Over the last 60 years or so, many contro-
versies relating to the law of the sea have involved the right to control and exploit resources, 
whether in the form of oil, fish, or other potentially valuable commodities.” Gerhard von 
Glahn & James Larry Taulbee, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International 
Law 296 (9th ed. 2010).  Claims to control and have access to the resources of the sea re-
sulted in unilateral claims to extensive territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and the 
continental shelf.  In response, states made an effort to codify the existing customary law and 
created many new treaty rules and several institutions that fundamentally restructured the 
traditional law of the sea. 
3 See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS]; Oceans and Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
UN, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
4 The National Security Council, under George W. Bush’s administration, concluded after 
a careful interagency review that UNCLOS clearly serves U.S. national security, economic, 
and environmental interests. John B. Bellinger III, Should the United States Ratify the UN 
Law of the Sea?, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-
agreements/should-united-states-ratify-un-law-sea/p31828 (last visited October 31, 2016).  
As a result, the Bush Administration strongly supported Senate approval of the Convention, 
as did the Obama administration. Id.  “The Convention provides clear, treaty-based rights for 
U.S. ships and aircraft to travel through and over the territorial seas of other coastal states.” 
Id.  The United States Navy strongly endorses that the United States become party to 
UNCLOS. Id.  The flaws President Reagan identified and opposed in the treaty “were fixed 
3
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trustworthiness to address broader human security issues like the 
economy, environmental degradation, climate change, disease, 
poverty, democracy and terrorism.  The U.S. could advocate a ‘Joint 
Maritime Development Regime,’ modeled after the Arctic Council.5 
Eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes, as well as tensions 
in the South and East China Seas, encompass the challenges and is-
sues that the Arctic Council is currently handling.  The Council takes 
into account the welfare of indigenous people making it into a model 
for a ‘Joint Maritime Development Regime’ based on the security of 
the individual or humans collectively as the referent object while the 
states remain the central actors in international relations and the prin-
cipal agent to address issues dealing with threats of security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Increased exploration for oil and hydrocarbons in the East 
Mediterranean Basin on the periphery of countries such as Cyprus, 
Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt has led to the discovery of enor-
mously significant gas and oil fields while mounting military tensions 
rise in Syria with millions fleeing to neighboring countries and the 
European Union (EU).6  Entrenched in an international crisis, the 
East Mediterranean is experiencing a ‘Renaissance’ in security terms 
by estimating the impact these developments will have on the 
strategic calculus of Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East.  The 
prosperity and security of key Eastern Mediterranean states are 
increasingly affected by events in the Levant Basin and surroundings 
 
by amendments to the treaty in 1994 (which led all other major industrial countries to join 
the treaty”). Id.; see also Robert C. “Rock” De Tolve, At What Cost? America’s UNCLOS 
Allergy in the Time of “Lawfare,” 61 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2012). 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/navylawreview/NLRVolume61.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2016). 
5 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RESPONDING TO A CHANGING ARCTIC, Session 2014-15, HL 118 
(UK); 20 Years of the Arctic Council: Making a Positive Future Impact, ARCTIC COUNCIL 
(Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/20-
year-anniversary (last visited May 12, 2017). 
6 See Tamsin Carlisle, The Eastern Mediterranean Basin Showing Promise for Oil, Gas: 
Fuel for Thought, THE BARREL (Nov. 16, 2015, 00:01 UTC), 
http://blogs.platts.com/2015/11/16/eastern-mediterranean-basin-oil-gas/; Najima El Moussa-
oui, Wave of Syrian Refugees Comes at a High Cost, DW (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.dw.com/en/wave-of-syrian-refugees-comes-at-a-high-cost/a-17067169. 
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in comparison to the two regions, the East and South China Seas, 
discussed in greater detail later. 
The volatile geopolitical region’s capacity in the Eastern 
Mediterranean for producing crises as well as slow-moving 
challenges—with potentially far-reaching consequences—has begun 
to compel the attention of analysts and policymakers.  The drivers for 
Eastern Mediterranean Security issues have started to occupy a more 
prominent place in security debates about Israel-Turkey-Iran-Iraq-
Palestine-Cyprus-Lebanon-Egypt-Jordan-Saudi Arabia relations em-
bedded in U.S., EU, and Russian national interests by imposing new 
intellectual and policy challenges on both sides of the Atlantic.  This 
contrasts with the U.S. pivot to Asia and strong presence in dealing 
with regional conflicts including the territorial issues in the East and 
the South China Sea.7 
Hence, fresh new approaches to security and cooperation in 
the East Mediterranean and China Seas is needed.  Rethinking U.S. 
foreign policy and geopolitical alliances requires a major overhaul to 
deter Chinese expansionism and Russian policies aligned to a 
doctrine where neighboring countries are part of their ‘sphere of 
influence.’  As compared to China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, 
Israel, Turkey, and Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean are all 
prepared to demonstrate military and naval force to protect their own 
and other countries’ fundamental rights and interests (such as 
Northern Cyprus8 in the case of Turkey and Syria in the case of 
Russia).  This is true not only in cases involving fishing and marine 
life, but also mineral and hydrocarbon resources, navigation and 
other uses of the seas by upholding the fundamental integrity of a 
‘sovereign North Cypriot’ or Syrian state. 
 
7 See Ian O. Lesser, The United States and the Future of Mediterranean Security: Reflec-
tions from GMF’s Mediterranean Strategy Group, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Apr. 2015), 
www.gmfus.org/file/5291/download. 
8 Northern Cyprus (Turkish: Kuzey Kibris), officially the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC), as part of an attempt to annex the island to Greece, prompted Turkey to in-
tervene in  Cyprus.  Recognized only by Turkey, Northern Cyprus is considered by the inter-
national community to be part of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cy-trnc.htm 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2017).  Due to its lack of recognition, TRNC is heavily dependent on 
Turkey for economic, political, and military support for the northeastern portion of the island 
of Cyprus. Id.  Because the international committees considers TRNC to be part of the Re-
public of Cyprus and, as such, a member of the EU, the aquis communautaire has been sus-
pended in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots until political conditions permit the re-
unification of the island. Id. 
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Solutions are needed for the long term to resolve issues relat-
ed to sustainable economic prosperity and political stability, not only 
in Syria, but the adjacent regions as well through greater cooperation 
instead of confrontation.  The international maritime law can work in 
resolving Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas’ disputes and con-
tribute to preparing confidence building parameters for further dis-
cussions of relevant issues related to sovereignty, political stability, 
and economic growth. 
The disputes over the sovereignty zones of the jurisdiction of 
islands are growing among regional players, most notably Turkey, 
Cyprus, and Israel, signaling an apparent return of power politics in 
regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, until recent events 
unfolded.  In the past year presidential elections have been held on 
both sides of the Cypriot Island which led to successful negotiations 
indicating that a ‘Cyprus Settlement’ may be achievable very soon.9  
Also, a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel was achieved on 
June 28, 2016, in which Israel agreed to a $20 million compensation 
for the victims’ families following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident 
in which nine Turkish participants died.  Here, it seems as if 
diplomatic channels are playing a more significant role.10  However, 
there are still major regional issues to be resolved requiring the states 
in the region to find an intergovernmental organization like the Arctic 
Council to reduce the perception of Turkey as a protagonist.  China is 
portrayed by the West as the protagonist in the South China Sea, 
while China argues that it is fulfilling its legitimate sovereign rights.  
Of all actors involved in the two corresponding regions, Turkey and 
 
9 Emilia Christofi, Negotiations for a Cyprus Settlement, CYPRUS NEWS AGENCY, 
http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=a8b114e790954b108ebdd68225c3adb8 (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2017). 
10 In addition to apologizing to Turkey, Israel is allowing Turkey to deliver humanitarian 
aid to the Palestinians through Israeli ports under the deal. See Oren Liebermann & Elise La-
bott, Israel, Turkey Strike Deal to Normalize Ties, CNN (June 27, 2016, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/26/middleeast/israel-turkey-relations/index.html (last visited 
November 5, 2016).  The deal also entails an eventual return of ambassadors and initial talks 
on a possible natural gas pipeline. Id.  Also in exchange, “Turkey will end all criminal or 
civil claims against Israeli military personnel and the State of Israel following the 2010 Is-
raeli raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid flotilla” known as the Mavi Marmara incident. Id.; 
see also Israel Sends $20 Million to Turkey for Families of Mavi Marmara Victims, THE 
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Sept. 30, 2016, 6:10 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-sends-20-
million-to-turkey-for-families-of-mavi-marmara-victims. 
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China are perceived as being a source of grave concern to other 
countries in the area due to their greater assertiveness and viewed  
hegemonic ambitions before Russia’s intervention in the Syrian con-
flict in the late summer of 2015.11 
The delimitation of maritime boundaries is governed by a 
body of law that has evolved through codification and progressive 
development as reflected in treaty provisions. In addition to the 
treaties, the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
various arbitral tribunals have also greatly contributed to its 
development.  The majority of maritime boundary disputes are 
resolved by agreement across the negotiating table.12  Therefore, the 
significance of a state practice should not be overlooked. 
Against the backdrop of recent regional developments and 
their international implications, the Eastern Mediterranean dispute 
over drilling rights off Cyprus’ coasts is closely studied in terms of 
laying out the general rules of law relating to maritime delimitation in 
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea which has been defined by the 
Conventions and by courts as well as by state practice with the 
objective to resolve the disputes.  Facing the grave challenges by 
considering the claims made by the different state regional actors, the 
study will analyze approaches to achieve a moderate and balanced 
approach based on the assumption that only cooperation and 
constructive dialogue can help realize its ambition of being pivotal in 
the region and reach a solution to its isolation, even with rival 
countries which are not recognized by some of the actors.  According 
to the relevant provisions of the Conventions, delimitation of the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between States 
with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by the agreement.  
In the absence of understanding, such a boundary is the line resulting 
from the application of equitable principles that produces a fair 
outcome, taking into account the circumstances of the area 
concerned.  At the outset, it should be emphasized that the principles 
of delimitation which have been laid down in the Conventions have 
 
11 Elliot Friedland, Turkey, China, Join Syrian Civil War, THE CLARION PROJECT (Aug. 
25, 2016), http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/turkey-china-join-syrian-civil-war# (last 
visited May 7, 2017); Sam Heller, Russia is in Charge in Syria: How Moscow Took Control 
of the Battlefield and Negotiating Table, WAR ON THE ROCKS (June 28, 2016), 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/russia-is-in-charge-in-syria-how-moscow-took-control-
of-the-battlefield-and-negotiating-table/. 
12 Anderson, Recent Decision of Courts and Tribunals in Maritime Boundary Cases, in VI 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 4119. 
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been formulated at a high level of generality.  For this reason, it is 
difficult to offer any precise account of the principles of delimitation, 
which might be applied in the future to unresolved boundaries.  Quite 
apart from the inherent generality and vagueness of the principles, 
each delimitation, including the Eastern Mediterranean delimitation, 
involves a situation with unique characteristics which must be taken 
into account.  Previous decisions and practices will at best point to 
the kind of factors to be considered and approaches to be adopted, but 
will not permit the deduction of a precise boundary line to be 
established but will open the door to a negotiated settlement of dis-
putes in the region. 
II. OVERVIEW TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN AND  SOUTH EAST ASIA 
The Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea disputes 
over islands’ sovereignty and jurisdiction of maritime zones are flar-
ing up.  Maritime boundary delimitation, which belongs to the cate-
gory of politically sensitive processes,13 could be used to defuse such 
tensions by the states involved.  It also could resolve issues including 
rights and interests of those states on fishing and marine living re-
sources, mineral and hydrocarbon resources, navigation and other us-
es of the sea.  Today, maritime boundary delimitation agreements 
have already been concluded providing a wealth of examples of state 
practices.  The theoretical total of actual and potential boundaries is 
more than 400.  Until now 188 maritime boundaries (about half of the 
total) have been delimitated while much unrest still continues around 
the world about delimitation awaiting some peaceful resolution.14 
 
13 “ ‘There is no boundary which is not political. The maritime boundary, like the land 
boundary, is the fruit of hard negotiations between [coastal] States, or respect of a decision 
of an international court.  The [International Court of Justice] ICJ observed that: ‘delimita-
tion, whether of a maritime or of a land boundary, is a legal-political operation . . .’ ” See 
KIM, supra note 2, at 12; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶ 56 (Oct. 12). 
14 Political geographical experts have advised that the theoretical total of actual and poten-
tial boundaries is in excess of 400. Gerald H. Blake, World Maritime Boundary Delimita-
tion: The States of Play, in MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND OCEAN RESOURCES 3 (Gerald H. 
Blake ed., 1987).  In comparison, the six volumes of International Maritime Boundaries, 
published between 1993 and 2011, contain reports on 188 boundaries, nearly half of the to-
tal. I-III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & L.M. Alexander 
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Over the years, heightened tension in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea has escalated potentially into an energy war 
because of disputes over drilling rights off Cyprus’ coasts. Turkey 
has taken a more assertive role by deploying naval frigates to 
accompany research vessels searching for hydrocarbons based on an 
agreement with the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC)—in 
waters considered belonging to the Republic of Cyprus.15  Also, Chi-
na has signaled that the Chinese military intends to project power be-
yond its immediate periphery (China Seas), into the open ocean, in 
pursuit of “national rejuvenation” even by the use of force.  Its aim is 
to counter what Chinese leaders see as U.S.-led efforts to check Chi-
na’s rise.16 
Although the potential presence of hydrocarbon resources in 
both regions opens a great deal of opportunities for closer regional 
cooperation, the issue of sovereignty and nationalism often challenge 
or even outweigh such prospects.  China’s contracting economy 
paired with stock-market volatility and corruption have caused China 
to deflect attention from the country’s domestic problems by drawing 
the ‘nationalist’ card.17  Incidents have been reported involving the 
deployment of naval military assets in the South China Sea over Chi-
nese land reclamation efforts in building artificial islands beyond its 
territorial claims in the China Seas.18  With the Chinese fleet de-
ployed to protect its territorial claims, tensions are rising between the 
U.S. and its allies against China in the region19 while the U.S. coun-
ters efforts to limit freedom of navigation by deploying naval frigates 
 
eds., 1993); IV INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & Robert W. 
Smith eds., 2002); V INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (David Colson & Robert W. 
Smith eds., 2005); VI INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (David Colson & Robert W. 
Smith eds., 2011). 
15 Stephen Glain, Gas Field Off of Cyprus Stokes Tensions with Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/middleeast/gas-field-off-of-cyprus-
stokes-tensions-with-turkey.html. 
16 Document: China’s Military Strategy, USNI NEWS (May 26, 2015, 12:13 PM), 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/. 
17 Andrew Stevens, China’s Stock Watchdog Admits Market’s Problems, CNN (Jan. 18, 
2016, 8:37 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/investing/china-stock-market-watchdog-
criticism/; see Niall Ferguson, Sinking Globalization, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20050301faessay_v84n2_ferguson.html?pagewant
ed=print&position. 
18 Ben Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and 
Policy Options, CONG. RES. SERV. (June 18, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf. 
19 Ben Brumfield, U.S. Defense Chief to China: End South China Sea Expansion, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/china/singapore-south-china-sea-ash-carter/. 
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through Chinese proclaimed delimited zones.20 
In the Eastern Mediterranean Theater of operations, the pro-
spect of prosperity by commercializing hydrocarbon discoveries has 
mixed implications for conflicting territorial claims.  Overall the 
commercial opportunities to exploit natural resources have negatively 
impacted key strategic, regional, political, and military U.S. allies: Is-
rael, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC),21 and Turkey.  The RoC and Is-
rael have emerged as gas producers.  Their newly discovered gas 
provides considerable sovereign wealth offering both a cost-effective 
source of energy for their import-dependent energy economies and a 
potential high-value source of revenues from gas exports into and be-
 
20 Christopher Bodeen & Robert Burns, China Warns U.S. Navy After Ship Sails by Chi-
nese-built Island, FORT FRANCIS TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://www.fftimes.com/authors/christopher-bodeen-and-robert-burns-associated-press; Phil 
Stewart & Nathaniel Taplin, U.S. Navy Sends Warship Near Disputed South China Sea Is-
land, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2016), https://gcaptain.com/u-s-navy-sends-warship-near-disputed-
south-china-sea-island/#.Vrm6uN-RYWE. 
21 See MICHÁLIS STAVROU MICHAEL, RESOLVING THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: NEGOTIATING 
HISTORY (2009).  In 1960, the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities established 
together the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ hereafter referred to as the (RoC).  Britain, Greece and 
Turkey became guarantors of the country’s independence based on the London and Zürich 
Agreements.  The most significant and controversial of the treaties was the Treaty of Guar-
antee, among Cyprus, Britain, Greece and Turkey, to ensure the republic’s “ ‘independence, 
territorial integrity, security and respect for its Constitution,’ and prohibited ‘all activity to 
promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.’ ” Id. at 25.  In case of a 
breach, Britain, Greece and Turkey undertook to consult each other and take the “necessary 
steps” needed to rectify the situation. Id. at 26.  If “ ‘common or concerted action [was to] 
prove impossible, each of the three’ reserved the ‘right to take action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.’ ” Id.  With a military coup 
on July 15, 1974, staged by Greek-Cypriot nationalists and elements of the Greek military 
Junta in an attempt to incorporate Cyprus into Greece, Turkey invaded Cyprus in accordance 
with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Colin Smith, Cyprus Divided: 40 Years on, a Family Re-
calls How the Island was Torn Apart, THE GUARDIAN (July 5, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/turkish-invasion-divided-cyprus-40-years-
on-eyewitness-greek-cypriot-family.  A separate state was set up in 1983 called the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) while continuing the search for reconciliation. Elihu 
Lauterpacht, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-The Status of the Two Communities 
in Cyprus, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 10, 1990), 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chapter2.en.mfa.  Cyprus is the home of two nations and there exist 
two democratically organized states on the island. Id.  Although Turkey and TRNC argued 
that the Greek Cypriot side had no authority to represent the Turk Cypriots on the behalf of 
the whole island, the international community recognized the Greek Cypriot community as 
the legitimate representative for all of the island known as the “Republic of Cyprus.” Id.  In 
this paper, the term “RoC” refers to the Greek Cypriot Administration located in the south-
ern part of the island. 
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yond the region.22  Turkey disputes the rights of the Greek Cypriots 
of the RoC to exploit these natural resources without the involvement 
of the Turk-Cypriots and perceive it as their responsibility to protect 
the rights and interests of the Turk-Cypriots by supporting the self-
declared TRNC both economically and militarily.23 
Accompanying the rhetoric of protecting the sovereignty and 
national interests of people is the perceived coercive strategic expan-
sion of intimidation through the use of naval forces in both regions.  
Viewed as power politics by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the U.S. and China in Eastern Asia, their assertiveness stands out 
as apparent hegemonic ambitions fraught with growing tension.  Un-
less diplomatic solutions are found to resolve the different interpreta-
tions of delimitation of maritime law, the same tensions in the South 
China Sea may expand and develop in the Eastern Mediterranean 
Sea.  The implications of the EEZ24 claims need to be sorted out ac-
cording to international law of the sea. If a ‘Joint Maritime Develop-
ment Regime,’25 modeled after the Arctic Council, is not established 
to arbitrate maritime boundary disputes, both conflicts now have the 
potential of escalating into another Persian Gulf Crisis. 
Resolving the regional disputes among states in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the China Seas, need to be accomplished diplo-
matically.  General rules of law about maritime delimitation as laid 
down by international conventions, courts, as well as state practice, 
must be respected.  Facing these serious challenges are countries in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the South China Sea, which are rivals 
 
22 Laura El-Katiri & Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri, Executive Summary: Strategic Studies In-
stitute and U.S. Army War College Press, STRATEGIC STUD. INST., 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/files/1243-summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
23 See generally TCA Fact Sheet: H. Res. 676 (Cyprus Dispute), TCA, http://www.tc-
america.org/resource-center/tca-fact-sheet-h-res-676-cyprus-dispute-702.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2017). 
24 An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the explo-
ration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. 
UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 56.  It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles 
(nm) from its coast.  UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 57.  See also Ayla Gürel & Laura Le 
Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, GLOBAL POL. TRENDS CTR. 
ISTANBUL KULTUR U., http://www. gpotcenter.org/ dosya-
lar/trhydrocarbons_gurel_lecornu_2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
25 Joint development regime embraces a state to convey some of its sovereign rights to a 
supra-national authority which is responsible to regulate the exploration for and exploitation 
of natural resources on the continental shelf, as well as the living resources and other uses of 
superjacent waters. 
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and have no diplomatic relations.26  Territorial claimant countries like 
Turkey and the divided Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and 
China and many neighboring countries in the China Seas are all in 
need of brokering a settlement. 
The United States, China, and countries in both regions must 
go beyond the heated rhetoric.  Different moderate and balanced ap-
proaches are required based on cooperation and constructive dialog to 
reach solutions to the territorial disputes to avoid escalating tensions 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea into a far more 
dangerous situation that will prove difficult to reverse.27  An explicit 
commitment and finely grained understanding of concerns, intentions 
and consequences are needed by the region’s leaders to improve hu-
man security by alleviating human deprivation and protecting the 
people’s health and welfare in the area.  The aim is to avoid a poten-
tial escalation of tensions by accepting legal judgments about the de-
limitation of maritime boundaries and thus begin a process of achiev-
ing peace and prosperity. 
III. THE NEED FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION 
Historically, states rarely delimited their maritime boundaries 
with other states.  In fact, “[o]ne of Shakespeare’s characters in The 
Tempest said he ‘would give a thousand furlongs of sea for an acre of 
barren ground.’  These days things are different: an acre of sea or 
seabed may be more valuable in some respects than an acre of the 
best ground.”28 
Therefore, this situation has changed in recent years. 
“Economic considerations as well as political and security factors 
 
26 James Holmes, Why Are Chinese and Russian Ships Prowling the Mediterranean?, 
FOREIGN POL. (May 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-russia-navy-joint-
sea-2015-asia-pivot-blowback/. 
27 China has long urged to organize an effort to promote the joint exploration of seabed 
resources without prejudice to sovereignty with other claimant regional states, as has already 
been done by Malaysia and Thailand (1979), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), and Malaysia 
and Brunei (2009). Michael Swaine, Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South 
China Sea, CHINA-U.S. FOCUS (June 5, 2015), http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-
policy/averting-a-deepening-u-s-china-rift-over-the-south-china-sea. 
28 David Anderson, Maritime Delimitation: Early British Practice, in MODERN LAW OF 
THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS 437 (2008) [hereinafter MODERN LAW OF THE SEA]; see also 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 1, sc. 1. 
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have made the delimitation of maritime boundaries an important 




Figure-1: RoC-Egypt, RoC-Israel, and RoC-Lebanon EEZ bor-
ders, RoC license exploration blocks. 
 
The commercial exploitation of these natural resources often 
requires that operators be allocated specifically defined areas to ex-
plore and exploit.  States became strongly motivated to claim new 
maritime zones within their jurisdiction.31  States began to claim 
boundaries further seawards from their traditional 12-mile territorial 
sea zone with other countries to maximize the commercialization of 
natural resources over which they have exclusive authority.32 
        Because of the geographical proximity of many 
states, their maritime zones often overlap to a greater 
 
29 Id. Perhaps the primary force behind the move to establish these boundaries has been 
the development of technology to recover highly valuable hydrocarbons and other non-living 
resources of seabed and subsoil. Jonathan I. Charney, Introduction, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at xxiii. 
30 Akin Unver, Beyond a Turkish-Greek Problem, FOREIGN POL. ASS’N (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/09/28/beyond-a-turkish-greek-problem/ (last visited May 
12, 2017) (illustrating the Cyprus oil and gas drilling). 
31 Guillermo Hierrezuelo Conde, La Postura Española en la Tercera Conferencia de las 
Naciones Unidas Sobre el Derecho del Mar con Respecto al Mar Territorial, ENCICLOPEDIA 
VIRTUAL, http://www.eumed.net/libros-gratis/ 2015/1432/espacios-marinos.htm (last visited 
July 18, 2015). 
32 Id. 
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or lesser extent.  There is therefore a need for bounda-
ries between such zones in order to avoid disputes and 
uncertainties over the right to exercise sovereignty, 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction and to exploit re-
sources.33 
As a result, “[t]he significance of maritime boundaries in internation-
al relations grew in the . . . second half of the twentieth century.”34 
        The limits of sovereignty and title to resources 
involve delicate political and security issues.  The 
risks involved in boundary disputes are often high: one 
need only recall Lord Curzon’s dictum: ‘frontiers are 
the razor’s edge on which hang suspended . . . issues 
of war and peace . . . .’ “ The existence of overlapping 
claims may inadvertently lead to disputes . . .. Over-
lapping claims may be akin to accidents waiting to 
happen. For this reason alone, establishing maritime 
boundaries is an important task for coastal States.35 
 
33 Aiman Rahman Khan, Impacts of the Bangladesh v Myanmar Case Regarding Delimi-
ation of Maritime Boundary (unpublished LL.M. paper), 
https://www.academia.edu/15062794/Impacts_of_the_Bangladesh_v_Myanmar_case_regard
ing_Delimitation_of_Maritime_Boundary (last visited July 18, 2015); see also R.R. Church-
ill & A.V. Lowe, THE LAW OF THE SEA 181 (3d ed. 1999)..  There are three typical situations 
in which states seek to agree on maritime boundaries: 
        The first situation arises where substantial activities subject to 
costal state jurisdiction are conducted o r are likely to be conducted 
in an area of actual or potential dispute . . . . 
        The second situation prompting a delimitation agreement arises 
where one or both states wish to stimulate uses, particularly fixed uses, 
of the area in question . . . 
        The third situation .  .  .  arises when governments seek to agree on 
a maritime boundary despite the absence of significant activity or interest 
in the region requiring a boundary. 
Bernard H. Oxman, International Maritimee Boundaries: Political, Strategic, and Historical 
Consideration, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 243 (1994). 
34 DAVID ANDERSON, Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements, in MODERN LAW OF 
THE SEA, supra note 28, at 417. 
35 DAVID ANDERSON, Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements, in MODERN LAW OF 
THE SEA, supra note 28, at 418, 418 n.4 (“Lord Curzon of Kedleston’s words, uttered in 
1908, provided the title for a collection of essays in honor of Professor Gerald Blake of the 
International Boundaries Research Unit of the University of Durham”) (“[I]f fishermen from 
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IV. THE LAWS OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
The body of law governing the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries was perpetuated by a new international economic order.  
It required codification and progressive development of principles 
and norms according to international law as exemplified in treaty 
provisions.36  The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) and ad hoc tribunals has significantly contributed to its devel-
opment, as well as state practice.37  The conventions, both the 1958 
Geneva Conventions and 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
vention (UNCLOS), rightly called “a Constitution for the Ocean,” 
have made significant contributions to developing general rules and 
principles to guide States in the drawing of boundaries.38  In addition 
to the Conventions, customary law in this matter has been extensively 
developed through decisions of the ICJ and various arbitral 
tribunals.39 
Quite apart from the inherent generality and vagueness of the 
principles, each delimitation either in the Eastern Mediterranean or 
the South China Sea, involves a situation that has its unique charac-
teristics.  In this context, the delimitation of the continental shelf and 
EEZ between littoral states in the China and Eastern Mediterranean 
Seas shall be effected by ‘agreement’ of international law taking ac-
count of all the relevant circumstances to achieve an ‘equitable 
solution.’  Previous decisions and practice will at best point to the 
kind of factors to be considered and approach to be adopted, but will 
not permit the deduction of a precise boundary line that must be 
established.40 
V.  RISING TENSION IN THE CHINA SEA 
The East and South China Seas are troubled areas of 
international tension because of overlapping territorial claims.  In the 
 
one side are arrested by the coastguard of the other side or if traces of oil are discovered in 
an area of overlapping claims.”). 
36 G.A. Res. 41/73 (Dec. 3, 1986). 
37 Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 
88 AM. J. INT’L L. 227-28 (1994). 
38 David Anderson, Recent Decision of Courts and Tribunals in Maritime Boundary Cas-
es, in VI INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 12, at 4119. 
39 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 181. 
40 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 182. 
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East China Sea, China and Japan are both claiming a group of islands 
with Taiwan making a separate claim.  Japan calls them the Senkaku 
Islands; China calls them the Diaoyu Islands and they are known as 
the Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan.41  The territorial dispute between 
China and Japan has been going on more than 100 years dating back 
to the end of the nineteenth century to the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894, while Japan’s defeat in World War II and Cold War  
geopolitics added complexity to claims over the island.42   
China is expanding its territorial claim in the South China Sea 
through reclamation efforts by building artificial islands and 
increasing its naval support of Beijing’s geopolitical objectives.43  
Former U.S. President Barack Obama and leaders of the countries in 
the South China Sea agree that easing tensions is needed to resolve 
any territorial disputes through legal means “where international rules 
and norms and the rights of all nations, large and small, are 
upheld.”44  Reports, which China denies,45 have gone as far as to de-
ploy an advanced surface-to-air missile system to the disputed 
Woody Island, a part of the Paracel Islands chain, it has controlled in 
the South China Sea for more than forty years but also is claimed by 
Taiwan and Vietnam.46 
 
 
41 Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, 
CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf. 
42 Tadashi Ikeda, Getting Senkaku History Right, THE DIPLOMAT, (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/11/getting-senkaku-history-right/3/. 
43 China’s Maritime Dispute, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-
marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide. 
44 Jeff Mason & Bruce Wallace, Obama, ASEAN Discuss South China Sea Tensions, But 
No Joint Mention of China, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 5:01 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asean-idUSKCN0VP1F7. 
45 Patricia Loudres Viray, China Denies Sending Missiles to Disputed Island, PHIL. STAR, 
(Feb. 17, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/17/1554039/china-
denies-sending-missiles-disputed-island. 
46 J.R.Wu & Andrea Shalal, China Sends Missiles to Contested South China Sea Island: 
Taiwan, REUTERS, (Feb. 17, 2016, 3:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-
china-idUSL3N15W1JP. 
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47 
 
 Figure-2: Artificial Island 
 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu issue (See Figure-3) highlights the more robust 
attitude China has been taking to its territorial claims in both the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea.48  It poses worrying questions 
about regional security as China’s military modernizes amid the US 
“pivot” to Asia.  In both China and Japan, meanwhile, the dispute 
ignites nationalist passions on both sides, putting pressure on 
politicians to appear tough and ultimately making any possible 
resolution even harder.  Former President Obama has confirmed that 
the security pact with Japan49 applies to the islands – but has also 
warned that escalation of the current row would harm all sides. 
 
 
47 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, China’s Island Factory, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-1446c419-fc55-4a07-9527-a6199f5dc0e2. 
48 Why is the South China Sea Contentious? BBC (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.combbccom/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349; see also “How Uninhabi-
tated Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” BBC ( Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139;   http://www.bbc.com//world-asia-
pacific-11341139. 
49 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Jan. 19, 1960), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.  The U.S. and Japan forged a 
security alliance in the wake of World War II and formalized it in 1960. Id.  Under the deal, 
the U.S. is given military bases in Japan in return for its promise to defend Japan in the event 
of an attack. Beina Xu, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (July 1, 
2014), http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437.  This means if conflict 
were to erupt between China and Japan, Japan would expect U.S. military back-up. Id. 
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Figure-3: Dispute between Japan and China over Senkaku Is-
lands/Diaoyu Islands 
 
In the case of the South China Sea, the Philippines, Republic 
of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam are principally 
affected by China’s claim to vast swaths of the South China Sea also 
referred to as the 9-dash line and the Spratly Islands some which are 
distinct from the sovereignty of certain islands, maritime zones and 
the sea’s resources under the national jurisdiction of such recognized 
states. (See Figure-4)  The area and disputes in the South China Sea 
are also preferably designated by the countries in the region as 
‘Southeast Asia’ to avoid the name of China. 
 
 
50 JAPANFOCUS, http://japanfocus.org/data/43412.gif (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
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51 
 
 Figure-4: China and other Country Territorial Claims 
 
Arbitration of all of these maritime boundary disputes are re-
quired to make judgments about the EEZ claims of international law.  
A ‘Joint Maritime Development Regime,’ modeled on the Arctic 
Council, would provide a forum to find diplomatic solutions based on 
arbitration instead of countries taking decisive or hostile actions to 
protect their claimed rights.  China’s unwillingness to clearly state its 
intent to lay claim to waters around man-made (artificial) islands and 
other waters could be better communicated and managed through 
such a Joint Development Regime.  Instead of Washington and others 
calling on Beijing to repeatedly clarify its stance on the “nine-dashed-
line” (9DL), which is the demarcation line used by the People’s 
Republic of China’s claims to major parts of the China Sea, a 
 
51 VOA, http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/files/2012/07/BB-South-China-
Sea-Rev3.jpg (last visited May 1, 2017). 
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framework would exist to discuss and negotiate these issues based on 
Law of the Sea. 
Two years ago, Beijing warned a Philippine military aircraft 
to leave areas around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.52 On 
May 21, 2015, the Chinese navy warned a U.S. surveillance plane to 
leave Chinese airspace when flying over newly made islands publicly 
challenging Chinese island-building on disputed reefs and shoals in 
the South China Sea.53 These incidents created new tension in a po-
tential global tinderbox as both U.S. and China shift forces into the 
area to protect their maritime interests.54  Former U.S. Defense Secre-
tary Ash Carter called for “an immediate and lasting halt”55 to the 
practice.  In a speech to diplomats in Singapore, he said, “the 
prospect of further militarization as well as the potential for these 
activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict among 
claimant states.” 56 
The Chinese Ministry of Defense issued a white paper titled, 
“Chinese Military Strategy”57 which vowed to strengthen its naval 
power in support of Beijing’s geopolitical objectives by safeguarding 
China’s maritime rights and interests.  The document clearly indicted 
the U.S. (and other neighbors) for taking “provocative actions” sur-
rounding Chinese reefs and islands.  China “reinforce[s] their military 
presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occu-
pied.” 58 
Bellicose remarks accompanied the white paper and current 
events involving the U.S. sending aircraft carriers and warships into 
the South China Sea to demonstrate its dominant military power in 
 
52 Manuel Mogato, China is Ordering Philippine Military Planes to get Away from Dis-
puted Areas of the South China Sea, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 7, 2015, 6:13 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-orders-philippine-military-to-leave-disputed-areas-of-
south-china-sea-2015-5. 
53 Jim Sciutto, China Warns U.S. Surveillance Plane, CNN (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html. 
54 Id. 
55 Ben Brumfield, U.S. Defense Chief to China: End South China Sea Expansion, CNN, 
updated May 30, 2015, 10:31 AM). http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/china/singapore-south-
china-sea-ash-carter/index.html. 
56 Id. 
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the region in the latest episode in a wary standoff between the U.S. 
and China over the two contested Parcels and the Spratly Island 
chains.59  U.S. officials and military officers pledge to fight to defend 
U.S. interests while many Chinese believe Beijing must now more 
than ever not back down and demonstrate to the U.S. and others that 
it will not be intimidated.  These tensions risk regional and global 
peace and prosperity. 
Sino-U.S. relations are at a critical stage of being derailed into 
an adversarial global conflict because of a few rocks and islands in 
the corner of the Asia-Pacific region.  A commitment by both Wash-
ington and Beijing is required to clarify their claims and grievances 
by addressing: 
1) [W]hether man-made islands can be used to justify 
12 nm territorial seas and EEZs that can be used to 
limit naval access; 2) [W]hether a coastal state with 
EEZs can demand that foreign militaries notify them 
before transiting or engaging in [activities within 
EEZ]; and 3) [Whether] the threat and resort to force 
over disputed territories or violations [of EEZ zones’ 
natural resources are legally justifiable].60 
About point 1), Man-made – “artificial islands, installations, 
and structures do not possess the status of islands.  They have no 
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the [EEZ] or the continental 
shelf.”61  According to customary international law and the Law of 
the Sea Convention 1982 (“LOSC”) relating to continental shelf, a 
coastal state has sovereign rights ‘ipso facto’ and ‘ab initio.’62  It 
does not depend on occupation or expressed proclamation to a conti-
nental shelf, which in any event shall not exceed 350 nm from the 
baselines.  Also, a coastal state is entitled to claim an EEZ of a 
breadth of 200 nm.  In these zones, the coastal state has exclusive 
 
59 Michael Forsythe & Jane Perlez, Step by Step, China Expands its Military in Disputed 
Sea, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 9, 2016, 10:51 PM), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Step-by-step-China-expands-its-military-in-
disputed-sea/articleshow/51333509.cms. 
60 Michael D. Swaine, Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South China 
Sea,CARNEGIE: ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (June 2, 2015), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/02/averting-deepening-u.s.-china-rift-over-south-
china-sea-pub-60274. 
61 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 60. 
62 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 77. 
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sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources either living 
or non-living which include the waters adjacent to the seabed, and of 
the seabed and the subsoil in its seabed.63 
Consequently, other states cannot make assertions over the 
natural resources in another country’s maritime zones.  Nevertheless, 
in both the continental shelf and the EEZ the freedom of navigation 
shall not be hindered as those waters, in essence, form part of the 
high seas.64  It is a trade-off between the viewpoints of the great mari-
time powers and the smaller coastal states.  Major sea-faring coun-
tries were reluctant to concede expansion of state jurisdiction over the 
high seas while the smaller coastal states sought extended maritime 
rights to safeguard the natural resources of their sea waters. 
As to point b) several coastal nations including China per-
ceive the entering of foreign navies into the EEZ as hostile acts to 
conduct surveillance activities.  China insists that it has the legal 
right, under the regulations of UNCLOS, to deny foreign navies free 
access in its EEZ.  The U.S. and many other countries reject this in-
terpretation.65 
 
63 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 55-58. 
64 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 56, 78; see Sami Doğru, Uluslararası Hukukta Sey-
rüsefer Serbestliği ve Deniz Güvenliği/Freedom of Navigation and Maritime Security in In-
ternational Law 125 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ankara University). 
65 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58.  According to Art. 58 of UNCLOS, all states, 
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight in EEZ: 
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the 
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally law-
ful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, 
and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply 
to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible 
with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Con-
vention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to 
the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws 
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far 
as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
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Finally, an unprovoked threat or use of force would constitute 
a clear violation of the UN Charter prohibiting such behavior accord-
ing to UN Charter Chapter VII.  Any sustained attempt by China to 
forcibly threaten or remove other claimants from disputed territories 
without any clear threat requiring selfdefense would seriously disrupt 
peace accompanied by a strong regional and international outcry.  
Beijing’s choice to not clearly communicate its disavowal of 
unauthorized use of force undermines regional trust with the West 
and many regional powers.  The introduction of China’s white paper 
to use force has altered its ‘peaceful development’ policy to a policy 
of territorial aggrandizement for the sake of security—jeopardizing 
its relations with the West and many regional states. 
At present, there seems little support for adopting a binding 
Code of Conduct to avoid future incidents of military confrontation.  
The United States and China must build the basis for demilitarizing 
and defusing the escalating tensions in the China Sea.  Unless actions 
are initiated to alter the current course of events, the U.S.-Sino rela-
tion threatens to escalate into a far more dangerous situation that will 
prove difficult to reverse. 
VI. THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONUNDRUM OF 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
Eastern Mediterranean regional peace and maritime stability 
are jeopardized by two of the most prolonged religious/ethnic border 
conflicts: the Arab-Israeli and Cyprus conflicts.  Both conflicts in-
volve disputes over territorial claims and disputed boundaries and the 
ownership of hydrocarbon resources.  In other words, the Cyprus 
conflict is a dispute today about the maritime jurisdiction of areas in 
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and no longer about an island divided 
by a green line patrolled by the United Nations’ peacekeeping 
troops.66  TRNC, Turkey, and Lebanon have all staked claims in the 
gas fields conflicting with or raising legal objections by other parties 
involving disputes relating to the Aegean Sea and delimitation of the 
continental shelf.  All these disputes affect relations among the 
neighbors of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.67 
 
66 SERTAÇ HAMI BAŞEREN, DOĞU AKDENIZ DENIZ YETKI ALANLARI UYUŞMAZLIĞI 
(DISPUTES OVER EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME JURISDICTION AREAS) 176 (2010). 
67 Laura El-Katiri & Mohammed El-Katiri, Regionalizing Eastern Mediterranean Gas: 
Energy Security, Stability, and the U.S. Role, STRATEGIC STUD. INST. (Dec. 2014), 
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Figure-5: Disputed Maritime Territory and Prospective Gas 
Fields 
 
The predicament about maritime jurisdictional zones’ disputes 
surrounding Cyprus began in 2003 when the RoC concluded an EEZ 
delimitation agreement with Egypt.  Two more delineations followed 
with Lebanon in 2007—awaiting ratification—and Israel in 2010.69  
However, the energy security speculation did not leapfrog until sig-
nificant offshore hydrocarbon discoveries were made in Cyprus and 
Israel (the Tamar in 2009 and the Leviathan in 2010) together with a 
2010 U.S. Geological Survey.70  The report suggested that the Levant 
Basin could hold up to 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas and 
up to 1.7 billion barrels of oil.71  The geological survey considered 
one-third of the region’s potential natural resources from the RoC’s 
and Israel’s maritime zones to some coastal and offshore territories of 
Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories.  Two-thirds remained 
 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1243.pdf. 
68 CIMSEC, http://cimsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/gas2.png (last visited Apr. 30, 
2017). 
69 Id. 
70 Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, 
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undiscovered.  Only then did energy experts begin to discuss gas 
transit opportunities for the region.72  Two transport options were 
considered to carry the gas: “[S]hipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
to the Mediterranean Sea, or building a gas pipeline that runs from 
the north of Israel to Turkey and then onwards to Europe.”73 
Due to the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the gas 
exporting countries in the region, it was highly unlikely that a pipe-
line through Turkey would be built74 until news arrived that the Turk-
ish and Israeli governments were poised to renew full diplomatic re-
lations after years of tension.75  Even the downing of a Russian 
military aircraft over Turkish airspace in October 2015 had far-
reaching economic and commercial repercussions, including Russia’s 
ban of most fruit and vegetable imports from Turkey, as well as its 
halt of the flow of millions of Russian tourists to Turkey.  While 
Russia continued gas sales to Turkey, “the countries’ $30 billion in 
annual trade decreased by 43 percent.”  In an attempt to normalize 
relations, Turkish President Erdogan offered an apology to Russian 
President Putin, which Putin had demanded for the downing of the 
Russian jet.76 
After the July 15, 2016 coup d’état attempt in Turkey, efforts 
to restore ties between Russia and Turkey accelerated as President 
Putin was the first leader to offer his support for Turkey.  According 
to President Erdogan, “[i]t was very important from a mental per-
spective, this kind of psychological support,” especially when com-
 
72 Sarah Vogler & Eric V. Thompson, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Im-
plications for Regional Maritime Security, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Mar. 2015), 
www.gmfus.org/file/4519/download. 
73 Olgu Okumus, Eastern Mediterranean Energy Sources Sunk by Political Waters, NAT. 
GAS WORLD (Dec. 24, 2012, 12:15 AM), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/eastern-
mediterranean-energy-sources-sunk-by-political-waters; List of Actions Selected for Receiv-
ing Financial Assistance Under the First CEF Energy 2015 Call for Proposals, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/CEF_Energy_2015_call_for_proposal
s.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).  The EU has requested that a feasibility study be completed 
involving a gas pipeline route from Cyprus to Greece Mainland via Crete. List of Actions 
Selected for Receiving Financial Assistance Under the First CEF Energy 2015 Call for Pro-
posals, supra. 
74 Okumus, supra note 73. 
75 Don Nissenbaum, Israel, Turkey Poised to Renew Diplomatic Relations; Secret Talks in 
Switzerland May Restore Ties Suspended Since 2010 Raid on Gaza-Bound Aid Ship, WALL 
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pared to former President Obama, who called much later offering his 
support “amid accusations that the United States played a role in the 
failed coup in Turkey” and Turkey’s “widespread resentment of the 
White House’s criticism of the resulting crackdown.”77  When both 
leaders President Putin and President Erdogan met in August 2016, 
their focus was to repair relations to its pre-crisis level. 
Against this backdrop, the friendly talks between these two 
historical antagonists raised alarm bells as Turkey is a member of 
NATO and essential to Europe’s efforts to halt the massive flow of 
refugees from Syria and Afghanistan.  Tensions between Washington 
and Ankara rose due to American support of PYD/YPG in Syria78 
and Iraq, as well as “President Obama’s reluctance to hand over Fe-
thullah Gulen, a reclusive Muslim cleric living in Pennsylvania 
whom [President] Erdogan ha[d] accused of leading the coup at-
tempt”79on July 15, 2016. Without the due process of law in accord-
ance with extradition treaties between both countries, growing anti-
Americanism in Turkey could ultimately benefit Moscow’s interest 
“to draw Turkey into its orbit and into the security and trade organi-
zations it is promoting in Asia.”80  Yet, despite the pledges both 
heads of state made to work together, Syria remains a “major 
potential fault line” because both sides view Syria’s President Bashar 
al-Assad differently.  President Erdogan sees him as a “bitter enemy” 
of Turkey while President Putin regards al-Assad as a longtime ally 
of Russia and has even “intervened with Iran in the Syrian conflict” 
to strengthen his country’s role in the region and secure Syria as Rus-
sia’s base of operations.81 
In October 2016, President Putin visited Istanbul to accelerate 
reconciliation between Russia and Turkey by signing an agreement to 
 
77 Neil MacFarquhar, Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/putin-
erdogan-russia-turkey.html. 
78 YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/Kurdish People’s Protection Units) is the military arm of 
the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat/Democratic Union Party) considered by the Turkish 
government as the Syrian affiliate of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) recognized as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the U.S. and a number of 
allied governments and organizations 
79  Supra note 77. 
80 Supra note 77. 
81 Id. 
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revive the suspended Turkish Stream natural-gas pipeline project 
which was “to run under the Black Sea to Turkey and then the Greek 
border.”82  The pipeline would allow Russian gas to reach the West 
by circumventing Eastern Europe and also allow “Russia to cut off 
gas supplies to neighboring countries like Ukraine without disrupting 
sales to countries farther west like Italy or Austria.”83  The revived 
Turkish Stream gas pipeline project would “replace a planned pipe-
line through Bulgaria that the EU blocked at the outset of the Ukraine 
crisis.”84  The agreement to build the pipeline also included “a reduc-
tion in the price that Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant, would 
charge for natural gas sold on Turkey’s domestic market,”85 which 
Russia has been trying for years to establish.  However, the Turkish 
Stream project was opposed by a few European governments, as well 
as the United States.  With the mounting tension with Russia and the 
geopolitical shifts, the region’s energy security came to the forefront 
and current outlooks were re-evaluated to avoid dependency on a sin-
gle major provider of energy and consider diversification of sources 
of upstream energy. 
The discoveries of hydrocarbon energy have prompted states 
with a direct claim to the Levant Basin to commercialize their energy 
sectors.  By creating the legislation to attract bids from companies to 
explore and exploit the oil and hydrocarbons within the proclaimed 
EEZs, the RoC and Israel have emerged as major regional gas pro-
ducers.  Both countries control cost-effective sources of energy for 
their import-dependent economies, as well as a potential high-value 
source of revenue from hydrocarbon exports to and beyond the re-
gion.86  The potential wealth derived from the exploration and devel-
opment of the natural resources has catalysed tensions in the Cyprus 
conflict.  Issues of sovereign wealth derived from energy resources 
have raised alarm bells suggesting that these revenues belong to both 
Turk- and Greek-Cypriots and not only those living in the RoC. 
 
82 Neil MacFarquhar, Warming Relations in Person, Putin and Erdogan Revive Pipeline 






86 Sarah Vogler & Eric V. Thompson, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: 
Implications for Regional Maritime Security, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Mar. 2015), 
www.gmfus.org/file/4519/download.  
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Besides the regional tensions in Cyprus and deterioration of 
Turkish-Israeli relations since 2011, peace and security are advancing 
in tandem with trilateral cooperation among Israel-RoC-Greece and 
Egypt-RoC-Greece over security and energy.  In the past year, Israel 
and RoC signed with Egypt a Memorandum of Understanding 
(‘MOU’) believing they could step in to alleviate Egypt’s falling pro-
duction levels.87  However, Italian oil firm ENI announced on August 
30, 2015, that it had discovered the largest known natural gas deposit 
in the Eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Egypt.88  The findings 
are a significant game changer and could lead to the annulment of the 
MOU agreements that Israel and the RoC signed with Egypt.  The 
discovery means that in upcoming years countries in Europe like Ita-
ly, as well as the Asian market and eventually Jordan, which plan to 
build their regasification terminals to handle LNG are the most im-
portant export markets for Egypt.89  It delivers a stunning blow to the 
Israeli and Greek Cypriot economies, as well as the gas partners Del-
ek Drilling and Noble Energy as they previously managed the only 
discoveries in the region, which included Tamar, Leviathan, Karish 
and Tanin in Israel and Aphrodite in Cyprus.90  Delek Dilling and 
Noble Energy had hoped to recoup some of their investments with 
the delivery of gas to Egypt. 
For the consortiums, a total strategic re-evaluation is needed 
for the European market and where it still has a competitive ad-
vantage.  Cairo’s energy security will improve the chances of gov-
ernment stability benefitting Israel, which “wants to see the military 
remain the core pillar of the Egyptian state.”91 
 
87 Gal Luft, Will Egypt’s Zohr Gas Field Sink Israel’s Leviathan?, MIDDLE EAST F. (Aug. 
31, 2015), http://www.meforum.org/5463/zohr-leviathan. 
88 Id.  The gas field Zohr is estimated to to be “thirty percent larger than the Israeli Levia-
than field” with the “potential of 30 trillion cubic feet of gas” and is easier to develop be-
cause it is much shallower than Leviathan. Id.  Also, it is not expected to face any major reg-
ulatory obstacles before development begins in early 2017, making Egypt energy 
independent while the commercialization of Leviathan is sill held up by Israeli politics. Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Luft, supra note 87. 
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VII. REACTION BY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY - ESCALATION OF 
TENSION 
Turkey, as a non-party to UNCLOS, objected to the RoC EEZ 
delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel.92  It claims 
as a de-facto divided island that the Greek-Cypriot community cannot 
represent the island as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ until reunified to es-
tablish a single EEZ.93  Due to conflicting claims by the Greek- and 
Turk-Cypriot communities regarding maritime delimitation within 
the broader context of reconciliation and bi-communal negotiations, 
Turkey finds that exploitation of natural resources should be deferred 
until a comprehensive ‘Cyprus Settlement’ is reached, as the re-
sources around the island belong to both communities and must be 
shared equitably.  Although the international community position re-
lating to sharing the sovereign wealth generated by commercializing 
natural resources is unclear, it is commonly accepted “that offshore 
natural resources belong to both communities.”94 
Turkey perceives the concluded unilateral delimitation 
agreements between the RoC and other coastal countries as an in-
fringement of international law and a border clash in the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin.95  The Lebanese also perceive the Israeli-RoC 
agreement delineating an EEZ between the country’s joint maritime 
Mediterranean frontiers a violation of Lebanon’s sovereign and eco-
nomic territorial rights that “jeopardizes peace and security in the re-
gion.”96 
 
92 Sami Doğru, Doğu Akdeniz’de Hidrokarbon Kaynakları ve Uluslararası Hukuka Göre 
Bölgedeki Kıta Sahanlığı ve Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Alanlarının Sınırlandırıl-
ması/Hydrocarbon Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and Delimitation of the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Region According to International Law, 
119 UNION TURKISH B. ASS’N REV. 503, 514-15 (2015), 
http://tbbdergisi.barobirlik.org.tr/m2015-119-1503. 
93 Id. 
94 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 13. 
95 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 10-11. 
96 Andreas Filis & Rafael Leal-Arcas, Legal Aspects of Inter-State Maritime Delimitation 
in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, 11 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257731; Charles Kennedy, Lebanon Protests Israeli-Cypriot En-
ergy Agreement, OILPRICE (June 21, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-
News/World-News/Lebanon-Protests-Israeli-Cypriot-Energy-Agreement.html “Lebanon’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour has sent an official letter of protest to UN Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-moon expressing Lebanon’s objection to a bilateral Israeli-Cypriot 
agreement delineating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between the country’s joint mari-
time Mediterranean frontiers. Mansour wrote that the agreement bilateral between Israel and 
Cyprus ‘violates Lebanon’s sovereign and economic rights and jeopardizes peace and securi-
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Turkey’s position regarding EEZ delimitation is based on the 
‘equity’ principle that calls for consideration of ‘special 
circumstances’ to respect ‘proportionality’ and ‘non-encroachment’ 
rules.97  Given the more than 20 times difference between coastal 
lengths of Cyprus and Turkey, the EEZ of Cyprus should be coexten-
sive with its 12-mile-wide Territorial Waters according to the Turkish 
view.  “Safe access to high seas and the underlying economic re-
sources of the seabed are of key significance to sustain Turkey’s high 
rate of economic growth.  As a regional powerhouse, Turkey tries to 
reap the lion’s share of natural gas trade to become an energy suppli-
er and transit hub.”98 
 
 99 
Figure-6: Turkey’s Disputed Delimitation of Coastal Lines with 
RoC 
 
VIII. REACTION BY THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN 
 
ty in the region.’ ” 
97 Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu, The EEZ Delimitation Dispute Between Cyprus and Turkey –
Part I 3-5 (The Fletcher School Tufts University) (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.academia.edu/9532415/Cyprus_and_Turkey_The_EEZ_Delimitation_Dispute_i
n_the_Eastern_Mediterranean_-_Part_I. 
98 Id. at 5. 
99 Sertaç Hami Başeren, “Disputes over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Are-
as/ Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Uyuşmazlığı,” Stratejik Araştırmalar, 8(14), January 
2010, p. 171. 
Continental shelf delimitation line 
between Turkey and TRNC 
 
Coastal length of  Turkey sub-
ject to delimitation area 
Coastal length of RoC subject to 
delimitation area delimitation line 
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CYPRUS (TRNC)—ESCALATION OF TENSION 
The Turkish Cypriot government (TRNC) denounced the uni-
lateral proclamation of the Greek Cypriot (RoC) government EEZ on 
behalf of the entire island.  This denunciation expressed that the 
extraterritorial rights over extracting offshore energy reserves includ-
ed in the bilateral agreements of Greek Cypriots with third parties 
were null and void. 
The Eastern Mediterranean Basin exhibits an ever-increasing 
amount of tension through the disagreement between Greek- and 
Turk-Cypriots about exploration rights around the island.  According 
to Turkey and TRNC, tensions are increased in the region because: 
- Greek Cypriots do not represent the Island as a 
whole, 
 
- “The Turkish Cypriots, who are the co-owners of the 
island of Cyprus, have equal, and inalienable rights 
over the exploration; extraction and processing of 
natural resources found within the maritime 
jurisdiction areas of the Island,”100 
 
- The maritime delimitation in a semi-enclosed sea 
like the Eastern Mediterranean could only be possible 
through arrangements to be made among all the 
countries concerned and by observing the rights and 
interests of all the parties. 
 
- “Consequently, neither the legislation adopted nor 
the bilateral agreements concluded by the Greek 
Cypriot Authorities have any effect. 
 
- In addition, it must also be kept in mind that Turkey 
has legitimate and legal rights and interests in the 
Eastern Mediterranean” in the same exploration area 
claimed by the Greek Cypriots which overlap with 
 
100 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus (Nov. 28, 2013), http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairsof-the-
turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
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Turkey’s continental shelf.101 
Turkey’s tough stand escalates.  In September 2011, the his-
torically troubled relationship between Turkey and RoC became even 
more complicated with the exploration for hydrocarbons in the re-
gion.  The RoC, in partnership with the U.S. Houston-based company 
Noble Energy, started exploratory offshore drilling in research Block 
#12, code-named “Aphrodite,” a gas field partially overlapping Isra-
el’s EEZ.102  It subsequently discovered, in the southern half of the 
island, gas in Block #12.103  The estimated discovery, between 142 
and 227bcm of gas, unleashed more political tension in Cyprus.104  In 
February 2012, the RoC announced a second licensing round.105  
Turkey immediately contested the exploration of natural gas deposits 
because of maritime boundaries and Block #12’s overlap with its 
continental shelf.  Also, TRNC has given Turks a license to explore 
in the same area.106 
As a result of the RoC’s intent to carry on with unilateral ex-
ploration for hydrocarbons, Turkey started back in September 2011 to 
collaborate with the Turkish Cypriots in restoring the political bal-
ance, as they saw it.  By taking reciprocal steps of equal significance, 
they signed an agreement demarcating the continental shelf between 
the island’s northern coast and Turkey in 2011.107  As part of this – 
mainly politically motivated – policy, in November 2011 the TRNC 
Ministry of Economy and Energy and Turkish National Oil Company 
(Turkish Petroleum Corporation also referred to as TPAO) signed a 
Petroleum Services and Production Sharing Contract.108  The contract 
 
101 Duygu Guvenc, Ankara Uneasy with US Ambassador’s Statements, HURRIYET DAILY 
NEWS, (Mar. 8, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-uneasy-with-
us-ambassadors-statements.aspx?pageID=438&n=ankara-uneasy-with-us-ambassadors-
statements-2007-03-08. 
102 Europe Report N°216, Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?, 
INT’L CRISIS GROUP 12 (April 2, 2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-
asia/western-europemediterranean/cyprus/aphrodite-s-gift-can-cypriot-gas-power-new-
dialogue last visited May 13, 2017. 
 




107 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14. 
108 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14. 
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authorized TPAO to conduct exploration for oil and gas, as well as 
drill and operate wells in the relevant areas.  At the same time, the 
TRNC granted to the TPAO hydrocarbon exploration licenses for 
maritime zones in the region including in the south of the island part-
ly overlapping Greek Cypriot exploration blocks.109 
TRNC claims equal, inherent rights on offshore reserves and 
believes that EEZ delimitation is directly linked to the sovereignty is-
sue, which is part of the ongoing comprehensive settlement negotia-
tions, and should be left to the discretion of the new partnership gov-
ernment.110  In response to unilateral pursuit by the RoC, the TRNC 
granted oil concessions to TPAO to conduct groundbreaking research 
and hydrocarbon exploration activities in seven EEZ areas that over-
lap with those demarcated by the RoC government.  TRNC relies on 
Turkey’s military and diplomatic support to assert its rights and juris-
diction over the maritime areas of Cyprus.111  Turkey holds a long-
standing position according to which islands facing longer coastal 
fronts should have diminished rights regarding generating maritime 
zones.  Turkey argues that Turkey’s related coasts, which face the 
mentioned delimitation area, extend from Gazipaşa/ Antalya to 
Deveboynu Cape of Muğla.112  As indicated in the ICJ Decision in 
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf Dispute of the St. Pierre 
and Miquelon Islands between France and Canada, for the non-
encroachment of Turkey’s relevant coasts, whose frontal length is 
relatively 10 times longer, the median line to be drawn between the 
related coasts of Turkey and RoC should head towards the east in a 
way to let Turkish coasts open into far distances.113  Besides, the 
transportation to the Suez Canal, the most important waterway in the 
region, and Antalya and Mersin ports, which are among the most 
important ports in the region, should not be blocked, as indicated in 
the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau decision.114  Turkey concluded a 
continental shelf delimitation agreement with the TRNC and 
 
109 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14. 
110 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 17. 
111 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 20. 
112 See infra Firgure 7. 
113 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I.C.J. 13 (June 1985), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf. 
114 International Legal Materials, Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimita-
tion of the Maritime Boundary, at § 104, 25 I.L.M. 251, 295 (Mar. 1986); see also MALCOLM 
D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION, CLARENDON PRESS 179 
(1989). 
33
Dogru and Reginbogin: Rethinking East Mediterranean Security
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017




conducted seismic surveys in the western sector of the RoC’s EEZ.115 
Against this backdrop, tensions began to escalate again on 
September 26, 2014, when the RoC extended licensing rights to a 
joint-venture between the Italian multinational energy company ENI 
and the South Korean state-owned gas company KOGAS to begin ex-
ploratory drilling.116  A week later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the TRNC issued a statement declaring the RoC’s extension of licens-
ing rights to ENI-KOGAS’s to drilling in the RoC’s block #9 - the so-
called Onasagoras field due south of the southern coastal city of 
Larnaca on the island - ‘illegal.’117  The TRNC considers such actions 
as an unlawful infringement of its sovereign right and seizure of sov-
ereign wealth.  It claims to possess these resources jointly with the 
RoC based on the 1960 Cyprus Accords and Constitution, which 
foresaw Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as equal constituent 
communities of the 1960 Republic.118 
In reaction, Turkey and NAVTEX (Navigational Telex) on 
October 3, 2014 issued a warning to mariners that Turkey would be 
conducting a seismic survey period from October 20 through Decem-
ber 30.119  It dispatched the research ship ‘Barbaros Hayrettin Pasa’ 
(hereafter referred to as Barbaros) and its escorting vessels ‘M/V 
Deep Supporter’ and ‘M/V Bravo Supporter’ into areas off the coast 
of the RoC.120  They were escorted by Turkish Navy guided-missile 
frigate TCG Gelibolu.  Based on the 2011 exploration license agree-
ment TRNC had granted to TPAO the ships entered the TRNC’s 
Block G that overlaps with the ROC’s Block #9, bordering the ENI-
KOGAS exploration site to survey the sea floor for hydrocarbons to 
protect Turkish Cypriot rights while monitoring ENI’s drilling vessel 
in Block #9.121  At approximately the same time, Russia, Israel, and 
RoC conducted a joint naval exercise in the waters of the Eastern 
 
115 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24,  at 14-15. 
116 Micha’el Tanchum, Turkey Temporarily Stands Down in Eastern Mediterranean 







121 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
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Mediterranean when the Barbaros entered the contested EEZ between 
the two countries to discover natural resources but also encroaching 
on Cyprus’s EEZ. 
The affair triggered a flurry of diplomatic reactions with Isra-
el and RoC calling on Turkey to withdraw and respect the maritime 
boundaries of Cyprus.  The incident caused international condemna-
tion by the EU and the U.S.122  The RoC president, Nicos 
Anastasiades, suspended further talks with the Turkish Cypriot 
leader, Dervis Eroglu, aimed at ending the division of the island, until 
Turkish offshore activities, which he deemed unlawful and threaten-
ing, ceased.  He asked UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to 
persuade Turkey not to violate Cyprus’s EEZ.123 Turkey became 
more isolated by the end of 2014. . 
In the international arena, the former European Commission 
urged Turkey to avoid any threats or actions directed against a mem-
ber state.  The Turkish government heeded no such advice and de-
ployed the ‘Barbaros’ in the RoC’s EEZ zone, asserting its resolve to 
protect the interests of TRNC.  However, Turkey faced even greater 
challenges with the emergence of a regional bloc aligned against An-
kara consisting of Egypt, Israel, the RoC, and Greece along with its 
current situation of having no ambassadors to Egypt, Israel, RoC, 
Libya and Yemen.  Two separate trilateral summit meetings held 
among Egypt, RoC, and Greece in November 2014 were of primary 
concern.  The one summit dealt with strengthening Egypt’s economic 
and security ties with the two EU members, Greece and RoC.  The 
second summit included Egyptian expression of interest in expediting 
the export of natural gas from the RoC to Egypt and condemning 
Turkey’s seismic explorations off the coast of southern Cyprus.124  
The emerging opportunities for trilateral energy cooperation among 
Israel, Greece, and RoC have made a strategic pivot toward Israel 
potentially isolating Turkey in participating in any deal about 
securing and transporting the natural resources under the sea.  
Through preliminary energy agreements with Israel and RoC, Egypt 
has also joined this game, especially with the recent discovery of hy-
 
122 Id. 
123 Michael Leigh, Why is Turkey Increasing Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean?, 
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2014/10/10/why-
turkey-increasing-tensions-eastern-mediterranean. 
124 Tanchum, supra note 116 
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drocarbons in Egypt.125 
Thus, two distinct but overlapping partnerships have emerged: 
Israel-RoC-Greece and in a parallel process Egypt and two Hellenic 
states, RoC and Greece.  As this suggests, RoC, Israel, and Egypt are 
key states primarily because of the pivotal role they play as rising en-
ergy producers.  All of this demonstrates a closer cooperation within 
the Mediterranean framework and on January 27, 2016, Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Greek premier Alexis Tsipras, and 
Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades respectively agreed to deepen 
energy and security interests through the exploitation of natural gas 
deposits off Israel and Cyprus.126  Meanwhile, Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan while still refusing to recognize the 
legitimacy of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi since the June 2013 
Egyptian coup d’état against the elected civilian rule of President 
Mohamed Morsi and ban of the Muslim Brotherhood,127 allowed an 
economic delegation in early 2017 to visit Egypt following the 
normalization of relations between Israel and Turkey in June 2016.  
The events stir questions about Turkey jump-starting trade and 
investment activity between Cairo and Ankara and President Erdogan 
altering his icy relations toward Egypt, which could help Turkey to 
break out from increasing isolation among its neighbors.128 
The cooperation among the countries of the Mediterranean 
has symbolic and economic value in ambitiously strengthening the 
relations between the Eastern Mediterranean and the EU.  While it 
will take until 2019 or 2020 before the Leviathan and Aphrodite 
 
125 Gabriel Mitchell & Zenonas Tziarras, Full of Gas, Full of Problems: The Eastern 
Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Showdown, NAT’L INTEREST (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/full-gas-full-problems-the-eastern-mediterraneans-11974. 
126 Luke Baker, Israel Hopes for E.U. Leverage with East Mediterranean Push, REUTERS 
(Feb. 1, 2016, 9:43 AM), http://uk.rE.U.ters.com/article/uk-israel-mediterranean-ties-
idUKKCN0VA2PP?feedType=RSS&feedName.E.U.E.U. 
127 Bryony Jones and Susannah Cullinane, “What is the Muslim Brotherhood?,” CNN 
(July 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-
explainer/index.html. Egyptian street protesters alleged "Brotherhoodization" of the 
government -- the imposition of the Islamist views propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
of which President Morsi is a member, leading to the overthrow of the government. 
128 Khalid Hassan, “Can economic opportunity bring Turkey, Egypt closer?, AL MONITOR, 
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fields start exporting gas, nonetheless, regional dynamics in regard to 
the economic and security prospects to transport gas by pipeline, pos-
sibly even via Turkey, or in liquefied form by ship to Europe have far 
reaching impacts.  The EU will have an alternative to its current 
dependency on gas imports from Russia, especially in light of wors-
ening relations with Russia due to the Ukraine crisis.  Furthermore, 
the prospect of strengthening EU energy security implies prosperity 
and security for both regions.129 
Other significant developments that fall within the same mari-
time geopolitical context include the long-standing Turkey-Greece 
(NATO members since 1952) dispute over the shared rights in the 
Aegean maritime zones.  Turkey considers portions of the disputed 
Aegean Sea gray areas and maintains that any unilateral effort from 
Greece to expand its maritime zones constitutes a casus belli (cause 
for war).130  Despite various efforts between Greece and Turkey to 
normalize ties, discussions remain focused on the economy, tourism, 
and energy to avoid the fundamental, but infinitely more sensitive is-
sues with the potential of events evolving to the brink of war. 
While the bilateral dispute between the Cypriot communities 
is lessening, the region remains engulfed by the Cyprus conflict’s 
spillover.  Inability to resolve the problem of sharing the hydrocarbon 
resources may turn the dispute into one of the sea with all adjacent 
coastal states not recognizing the established maritime boundaries in 
the region.  Thus, cooperation among all the littoral states — Turkey, 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Greece, Palestine, TRNC, and RoC — 
is needed but currently unlikely.  Territorial claims of an EEZ pose 
increasing tensions and possible armed conflicts between interested 
parties in the region.  RoC argues that Turkey’s deployment of the 
“Barbaros” to Block #9 in the fall of 2014 was a serious violation of 
its sovereignty.131  While the RoC authorities cannot prevent the 
“Barbaros” from traversing its waters within the EEZ according to 
UNCLOS,132 the conduct of research operations undertaken in its 
EEZ by the Turkish Government is considered a breach of interna-
tional law by the RoC.  According to UNCLOS, “States shall have 
due regard to the rights and duties . . . and shall comply with the laws 
 
129 Id. 
130 Augusto Sinagra, The Problem of Delimitting the Territorial Waters Between Greece 
and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, in THE AGEAN SEA 2000, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM İN THE AEGEAN SEA 170, 171 (Bayram Öztürk ed., 2000). 
131 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
132 See UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58. 
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and regulations”133 of the coastal state in the EEZ.  However, the 
Convention does not refer to the measures a littoral state is entitled to 
take in case its sovereign rights regarding the continental shelf and 
the EEZ are violated.  Nonetheless, the International Law Commis-
sion back in 1956 considered the exercise of enforcement measures 
by the coastal state with the view of protecting its natural resources to 
fall within the scope of defending its “sovereign rights.”134  Conse-
quently, the RoC believed such unauthorized actions constituted 
criminal offenses and justified arresting the members of the crew and 
the company owning “Barbaros.”  However, caution was warranted 
as an armed conflict could ensue. 
Turkey’s policy of sending the “Barbaros” was not baseless.  
In its view, RoC’s EEZ zone remained unrecognized because the 
Greek-Cypriots of the RoC misused their power in acting as the sole 
legal representative of Cyprus, ignoring the entity in the north.  “Bar-
baros” was sent to protect the rights and interests in the area, which is 
a constituent element of the TRNC.  According to UNCLOS Art. 300 
related to “Good Faith” and “Abuse of Rights”: “States Parties shall 
fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention 
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in 
this Convention in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of 
right.”135 
The tense affairs in the eastern Mediterranean region are rep-
resentative of new developments that have caused a shift in tradition-
al patterns of enmity and amity among the Eastern Mediterranean’s 
primary actors: Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.  Former 
President Obama’s global energy security policy as part of America’s 
national security was to fight the use of energy as an instrument to 
undermine the security of nations.  Former U.S. Vice President Presi-
dent Joe Biden, in his November 22, 2014 address to the Atlantic 
Council summit in Istanbul, said, “For the [Eastern Mediterranean] 
region, it holds the promise of enhancing stability and prosperity by 
bringing together Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and hopeful-
ly one day Lebanon.  It also has the potential to bring new supplies to 
 
133 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58(3). 
134 Rep. To the General Assembly, at 297, reprinted in ARTİCLES CONCERNİNG THE LAW 
OF THE SEAS WİTH COMMENTARİES (United Nations 1956). 
135 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 300. 
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Europe, to increase its energy security by diversifying energy re-
sources.”136  In other words, the U.S. envisions a liberal world order 
in which prosperity and stability are symbiotic in achieving security.  
The energy resources under the sea in the Eastern Mediterranean re-
gion harbor wealth that in turn can bring peace to the area.  However, 
U.S. foreign policy fails to refer to the ultimate security necessary to 
attain peace, which is the socially, historically and religiously em-
bedded individual physical being.  This requires a deepening of the 
values within which ideas and beliefs are deconstructed and problem-
atized.137  U.S. foreign policy must replace current static concepts of 
security with a much more proactive comprehensive and well-
coordinated security strategy through fine-tuned diplomacy drawing 
on broader human security issues like refugees, human trafficking on 
the high seas, environmental degradation, climate change, water 
shortage, disease, poverty, democracy, and terrorism as part of a se-
curitized public policy.  The individual is the “irreducible base unit” 
for explorations of security with the state remaining the central actor 
in international politics and principal agent for addressing security is-
sues.138  In a broad approach to human security and resolution of mar-
itime disputes by international law, allies together with other powers 
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the regions.  The 
U.S. could complement the ambitions of regional pivotal or major 
powers by becoming a signatory to UNCLOS to support international 
maritime law arbitration as a gateway to addressing human and glob-
al energy security.  The U.S. could advocate a “Joint Maritime De-
velopment Regime,” modelled on the Arctic Council where the or-
ganization would arbitrate maritime boundary disputes by sorting out 
the international law implications of the EEZ claims. 
IX. U.S., CHINA, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA’S SHIFT IN EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS – RISING TENSIONS 
For over two decades, the United States has placed the issues 
 
136 Vice President Joe Biden, Remarks on European Energy to the Atlantic Council 
Energy and Economic Summit (Nov. 22, 2014) (transcript available on The White House 
website located at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/22/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-european-energy-security-atlantic-
council (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
137 Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD 
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 268. 
138 Steve Smith, The Contested Concept of Security, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND 
WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 32. 
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of maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas on 
the backburner.  As the Chinese economy contracts and potential 
domestic social unrest rises, the Chinese government has chosen a 
strategy to transition from a nation only interested in economic de-
velopment to a country committed to defending Chinese global inter-
ests.  China’s commitment suggests a national tenacity to the extent 
of being prepared to use force, if need be, most notably in the China 
Seas.  The prosperity and security of East Asian states are increasing-
ly affected by this geopolitical shift involving disputes between Chi-
na and its neighbors over islands’ sovereignty and jurisdiction of 
maritime zones.  China has decided to step forcefully onto the world 
stage while the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of rebalancing its military 
assets from the Middle East to the Asian-Pacific due to considerable 
economic and political challenges. 
While Chinese warships have begun proclaiming control over 
disputed waters and islands, there have been naval skirmishes be-
tween China the Philippines and Japan.  “China is using land recla-
mation to turn” rocky shoals into little fortresses some even having 
airfields.139  It appears China intends to claim the entire South China 
Sea for itself.  The U.S. reaction is full of threatening remarks pledg-
ing to defend the interests of open seas in international waters while 
many Chinese believe they must demonstrate their steadfastness and 
not back down through intimation.  In short, the cycle of tension is 
rising, risking regional and global peace and prosperity. 
Many neighboring countries, such as Japan, Philippines, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, are objecting strongly.140  The Republic of 
the Philippines filed a complaint against the People’s Republic of 
China under the UNCLOS with the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA)141 and on November 29, 2015, the PCA ruled in the Philip-
 
139 China is Flexing its Rapidly Modernizing Military Muscle.  This was Going to Happen 




141 The PCA is a permanent bureaucracy that assists temporary tribunals to resolve 
disputes among states (and similar entities), intergovernmental organizations, or even private 
parties arising out of international agreements.  The cases span a range of legal issues 
involving territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international 
investment, and international and regional trade. The Republic of the Philippines v. The 
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pines’ favor on the question of jurisdiction.  With the jurisdictional 
issue resolved, the court evaluated the merit of four legal assertions 
made by the Philippines. 
a. Status of Beijing’s “nine-dash line” (9DL) claim in the 
South China Sea.  Manila argued that the 9DL is an excessive mari-
time claim and not in line with the entitlements for coastal states un-
der UNCLOS. 
 
b. The Philippines argued that China’s occupation of various 
features of the Spratly Islands are illegal and claims to title or sover-
eignty over completely submerged areas, or historical rights to living 
and non-living natural resources, including control of maritime navi-
gation, are illegitimate. 
 
c. The Court should evaluate the Philippines’ argument that 
China is illegally exploiting natural resources within areas that would 
fall under the Philippines’ EEZ under UNCLOS. 
 
d. Manila claimed that China has interfered with its ability to 
navigate freely its own EEZ.142 
On July 12, 2016, the tribunal at the Hague-based PCA issued 
a unanimous award to the Philippines in the case of The Republic of 
 
People’s Republic of China, PCA Nº 2013-19, at 1 ¶1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506. 
142 Ankit Panda, Philippines v. China: Court Rules Favorably on Jurisdiction, Case Will 
Proceed, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 30, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/philippines-v-
china-court-rules-favorably-on-jurisdiction-case-will-proceed/. 
The fact is, according to the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the Treaty of Wash-
ington in 1900 and the Convention Between the United States and Great 
Britain of 1930 which defined the territory of the Philippines, the west-
ern boundary of the Philippines is delimited by 118 degrees east longi-
tude.  The Huangyan Island [Scarborough] and Nansha Islands [Spratly] 
are completely to the west of 118 degrees east longitude.  They are not 
the Philippines’ territory.  After the Philippines gained independence, the 
domestic law of the Philippines, and the relevant treaties concluded by 
the Philippines all accepted the legal force of the three treaties men-
tioned above, and confirmed the scope of its territory to be limited by 
118 degrees east longitude.  Nevertheless, after the 1970s, the Philip-
pines [dictator Marcos] staged four military operations and illegally in-
vaded and occupied eight islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands.  
This is what is at the bottom of the territorial dispute between China and 
the Philippines. 
Wang Yi on the South China Sea issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum, CHINADAILY, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-08/07/content_21532990.htm (last updated Aug. 7, 
2015, 22:52). 
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Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China143 concerning mari-
time entitlements and the status of features in the South China Sea, 
among other issues. 
As to Point a) regarding the “Nine-Dash-Line . . . the Tribunal 
concluded, ‘that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources 
in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished 
to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic 
zones provided for in the Convention . . . [and] there was no legal ba-
sis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas 
falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”144 
As to Point b) the Tribunal concluded “that none of the Sprat-
ly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones.  The 
Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime 
zones collectively as a unit.  Having found that none of the features 
claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic 
zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a bounda-
ry—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic 
zone of the Philippines because those areas are not overlapped by any 
possible entitlement of China.”145 
As to Point c) Harm to Marine Environment, the Tribunal 
found “[t]hat China had caused severe harm to the coral reef envi-
ronment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile 
ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered 
species . . . (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral 
reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such 
activities.”146 
Finally, as to Point d), “the Tribunal found that China had 
violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic 
 
143 Ankit Panda, International Court Issues Unanimous Award in Philippines v. China 
Case on South China Sea, THE DIPLOMAT (July 12, 2016), 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/international-court-issues-unanimous-award-in-philippines-
v-china-case-on-south-china-sea; see PCA Case No 2013-19: In the Matter of the South Chi-
na Sea Arbitration, PCACASES.COM, http//: www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN-20160712-
Award.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
144 Matikas Santos, Key Points of Arbitral Tribunal’s Verdict on PH-China Dispute, 
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zone by (a) interfering with Philippines’ fishing and petroleum explo-
ration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent 
Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone,” interfered with the Phil-
ippines’ ability to navigate freely its own EZZ.147 
China’s Foreign Ministry announced even before the Tribunal 
award that it neither accepts nor recognizes the legitimacy of the Tri-
bunal’s award and will continue its activities in the South China 
Sea.148  After the Tribunal award the new government in the 
Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, cau-
tiously responded, to allow China to “forge a path to compromise, at-
tempting to provide China with a face-saving ‘off ramp’ after the 
highly embarrassing result of the award.”149 
The nature of future maritime and even territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea has changed considerably.  “China’s ambiguous 
and capacious nine dash linehas been declared illegal under interna-
tional law by a Tribunal convened under the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of Sea.”150  While features will not change anytime 
soon and while artificial islands will not return to their natural, pre-
reclamation state as submerged reefs or partially exposed rocks, the 
legal understanding of these disputes will stand as an important prec-
edent. 
Unlike the geopolitical tension in the South China Sea, the 
Eastern Mediterranean disputes are overshadowed by Syria’s Presi-
dent Assad’s request that Russia intervenes militarily on its behalf to 
support governmental ground forces on the verge of defeat against 
rebel groups.151  The Russian involvement in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean until September 2015 was more about soft power demonstrating 
its presence in the region through naval manuevers.152  Russia’s in-
tervention provided Putin the opportunity to strengthen its influence 
in the Middle East, dilute the international criticism and sanctions re-
lated to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, and through massive 




149 Panda, supra note 142. 
150 Panda, supra note 142. 
151 Bill Chappell, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria After Assad’s Request, NPR (Sept. 30, 
2015, 8:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russia-
begins-conducting-airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request. 
152 Holly Yan, Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are Standing by the Regime, 
CNN (Aug. 29, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-
china-russia-supporters/index.html. 
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gee migration to Europe.  This migration was designed to cause de-
stabilization and polarization among NATO partners in the East due 
to their nationalistic and oppressive handling of the humanitarian ref-
ugee crisis.153  The Syrian Conflict became the watershed resulting in 
a very efficient massive joint air and naval military build-up of 69 
aircraft, weapon stockpiles, and more than a dozen warships.154  The 
Kremlin is in Syria to stay and Putin recently called on Russia’s Par-
liament to enact legislation to extend the deployment of the Russian 
Air Force at Khmeimim Air Base outside Latakia, Syria, where its 
planes have flown missions for almost a year in support of Assad’s 
government.155 
Before massive migration of refugees to Europe and Russia’s 
intervention in Syria, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean focused 
on Turkey’s sending vessels in the fall of 2014 to accompany explo-
ration vessels into EEZ waters off the coast of the RoC.  Following 
international condemnation by Europe and the U.S., there was a mo-
dus operandi of “wait and see” during 2015.156  Turkey did not send 
any vessels to the region again.  Instead, the Turkish government 
demonstrated restraint partially due to parliamentary elections in 
Turkey in June 2015.157  Also, Greek and Israeli elections were held 
in the earlier part of the same year as well as presidential elections in 
the TRNC in April 2015.  Turkey waited to see how domestic and in-
 
153 Ellie Geranmayeh & Kadri Liik, The New Power Couple: Russia and Iran in the Mid-
dle East, ECFR, at 1 (Sept. 13, 2016), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/iran_and_russia_middle_east_power_couple_7113
. 
154 Gabriel Grosu, The Increasing Influence of Russia in the Middle East Region, 
MEDITERANEAN AFF. (Feb. 10, 2016),   http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/increasing-influence-
russia-middle-east-region (“Based on satellite images, in the first stage, it was identified as 
twelve bombers Su-24M and Su-25SM attack aircrafts, six Su-34 bombers, four SU-30CM 
and helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8 [were deplyed to Syria].  On November 17, 2015, the 
involvement of 25 long-range bomber sandan, additional eight Su-34 bombers and four Su-
24CM bombers into the operations in Syria was announced.  To protect the air base in Syria, 
special forces from navy (from the black sea fleet) and special forces of the 7th air assault 
(mountain) airborne division were dislocated.  According to [reports], a minimum of seven t-
90 tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers btr-80 were also present.”). 
155 MacFarquhar, Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously, 
supra note 82. 
156 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
157 Alberto Nardelli, Turkey Election Results: What You Need to Know, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/jun/08/turkey-election-
results-what-you-need-to-know. 
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ternational political developments unfolded in the region when Rus-
sia intervened. 
Russia, China, and Turkey are pushing different foreign poli-
cy agendas rebalancing their roles internationally and regionally.  The 
delicate geopolitical regional crises have begun to compel the atten-
tion of slow-moving U.S. analysts and policymakers to contend with 
conducting a campaign against ISIL and ambitious countries rivalling 
the vital interests of the U.S. through the use of energy as a tool to 
undermine the security of nations with potentially far-reaching con-
sequences.  Retrenchment until just recently was the guiding princi-
ple of U.S. foreign policy due to American political and economic 
conditions.  Former President Obama’s goal has been to limit U.S. 
foreign policy entanglements.158  Militarily in the Middle East, the 
U.S. focused on using a combination of airstrikes with intelligence 
and reconnaissance missions, increased financial and military re-
sources to advise and assist regional proxies, including moderate Syr-
ian rebels, which have failed, and successful Kurdish peshmerga of 
Northern Iraq and Syria, referred to as YPD militia forces believed by 
Turkey to be closely associated with the Turk-Kurdish terrorist or-
ganization called PKK.159  Diplomatically, “the Obama Administra-
tion . . . endorsed a parallel effort to build a regional coalition, which 
would curtail the flow of foreign fighters and money to ISIS” while 
seeking a political solution.160 
Former President Obama attempted prudent steps to avoid an 
extensive commitment of U.S. troops.  Instead, he supported a coun-
terterrorist campaign consisting of regional partners.  Neither of these 
missions requires an extensive commitment of U.S. Forces and stands 
in marked contrast to the previous Bush administration’s ambitions 
for regime change and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan or man-
power-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq.161  While the 
U.S. government’s policy of retrenchment from the Eastern Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East sounds theoretically fulfilling, the reality 
on the ground is more complex. 
 
158 Lexington: The Obama Doctrine, ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21567354-barack-obamas-foreign-policy-
goal-his-second-term-avoid-costly-entanglements. 
159 Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, The Retrenchment War: Why the War 
Against ISIS Will be Fought on the Cheap, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-09-24/retrenchment-war. 
160 Id. 
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Weeks after Russian military intervention, Turkey on No-
vember 24, 2015, citing previous warnings about Russian violation of 
its airspace, shot down a Russian attack bomber Su-24, at the Syrian-
Turkish border.162  This incident and its outcomes resulted in an eco-
nomic boycott of Turkey and other geopolitical tactics of isolation by 
Russia.  Russia used the incident also as a pretext to reinforce its 
military deployments in Syria and rapidly install the S-400, one of the 
most advanced anti-aircraft defense systems in the world.  S-400 al-
lows the Russians to monitor any flight in the region within a radius 
of 600 kilometers across the entire Syrian territory plus flights of the 
U.S. and its allies.  Besides monitoring the airspace of neighboring 
states such as Lebanon, Israel and small portions of Jordan, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia, the S-400 provides aerial target defense at ranges of up 
to 400 kilometers hitting tactical and strategic aircraft, ballistic and 
cruise missiles from its military base in Latakia.163  Furthermore, the 
Russians targeted the “moderate Islamists,” who fight Assad’s forces 
and were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.164  The U.S. 
and the West had already deployed aircraft to the NATO Incirlik Air-
base near Adana, Turkey to destroy the Islamic State of the Levant 
(ISIL) before Russia’s military intervention in Syria.165  The deploy-
ments of military assets by the U.S. and Russia to the region has put 
both countries at odds as to which rebel groups are primary targets to 
destroy.  The power vacuum to jointly fight ISIL, a common adver-
sary, led Turkey and Saudi Arabia to jointly flex their muscles and 
join forces to engage in a higher-intensity war in the Syrian theater to 
destroy the Assad regime and ISIL.  Events of this kind bear serious 
risks for the West.  They provoke further Russian and Iranian in-
volvement in Syria, sparking a NATO-Russia confrontation.  Conse-
quently, talks in Geneva pursue a political solution to halt hostilities 
and provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population in the short 
term.  It is uncertain if and when the spiral of violence, chaos, and the 
 
162 Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane – What We Know, BBC: NEWS, (Dec. 1, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581. 
163 Grosu, supra note 154. 
164 Ironically, Saudi Arabia differs with Qatar and Turkey about financing the Islamic 
organization, Muslim Brotherhood, whose Palestinian branch is Hamas, and an enemy of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia making Qatar the exception to the Gulf Cooperation Council rule. 
165 Incirlik Air Base, GLOBAL SECURITY, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik.htm (last visited May 1, 2017). 
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civilizational humanitarian crisis that has extended from the Middle 
East across the Eastern Mediterranean with millions of Syrians seek-
ing asylum in Europe will end. 
Russia’s and China’s involvement in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean Sea is demonstrated by their international presence by holding 
joint naval manuvers efecting relations with Israel, Egypt, Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia.166  A powerful new alliance of two major eastern 
giants is flexing its muscles in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, which 
is the very backyard of Western Europe — much as China has done 
on its own in the Pacific.  In the context of these regional develop-
ments, the driver related to maritime security and exploitation of hy-
drocarbon interests for the respective regions has begun to occupy a 
more prominent place in U.S. security.  Closer analysis of regional 
dynamics is expanding.  Israel-Turkey-Iran-Palestine-Cyprus-
Lebanon-Egyptian relations embedded in U.S., EU, and Russian rela-
tions and Philippines-Vietnam-Malaysia-Brunei-Taiwan-Japan rela-
tions, respectively, entrenched in Chinese and U.S. interests have im-
posed new intellectual challenges. 
These developments are impacting the strategic calculus of 
the U.S., Europe, and the Middle and Far East in light of the current 
conflict in Ukraine which spawned the worst crisis between Russia 
and the West since the end of the Cold War.  Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its military support for separatist forces in the Ukrainian 
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk have caused a hotspot of tension 
bordering at times on the brink of war between Russia and the 
Ukraine.167  The geopolitical shifts have challenged European and 
NATO security creating an uneasy situation and altered the U.S. poli-
cy of retrenchment to implement a policy of demonstrating military 
resourcefulness through joint military exercises in Eastern Europe, 
deployment of F-22 fighters to eastern Europe and multilateral coor-
dination of economic sanctions against Russia, economic diversity to 
fight countries using energy as a weapon to undermine a nation’s se-
curity with a strong emphasis on respect for the sovereign integrity of 
Ukraine and international law.  The challenges in the Far East require 
a deployment of U.S. naval forces to the China Seas.  All these 
 
166 Carol J. Williams, First Russia-China Naval War Games Underway in Mediterranean, 
L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2015 7:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/E.U.rope/la-fg-china-
russia-joint-naval-manE.U.vers-20150511-story.html. 
167 Rob Ferguson, Ukraine: Imperialism, War and the Left, 144 INT’L SOCIALISM (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://isj.org.uk/ukraine-imperialism-war-and-the-left/. 
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measures demonstrate different types of power to coerce Russia to re-
think its policies towards Ukraine and China to reconsider its policies 
towards its neighbors in the China Seas region.  Nothing has 
changed.  Hence, a rethinking of new approaches to security and in-
ternational relations in the Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas 
may bear more fruits. 
As Russia uses international law to argue that the Assad gov-
ernment in Syria is the only legitimate government, turning all anti-
Assad fighters into terrorists from ISIL or al Qaeda-related, U.S.- or 
Turkish-backed “moderates” are conceding the lead to Russia and its 
strategic aims.  Without a clear goal or fixed positions beyond a ‘po-
litical process,’ to resolve the Syrian civil war, there is barely a 
glimmer of hope to end the humanitarian crisis in Syria and return 
peace and stability to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East re-
gions.  The U.S. needs to reverse its apparent restraint and do what 
historically Great Powers do best – fight for their national interest as 
they define them. 
After the war with Georgia, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev used the terms “near abroad” and “privileged interests.”168  
He considers bordering countries within a “sphere of interest” mak-
ing Ukraine’s Crimea and Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia ex-
amples of aggravated concern about Russia’s strategic intentions and 
long-term policy towards its neighbors.169  The same terms were used 
in the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of Au-
gust 23, 1939, and supplemented on September 19, 1939, after the 
joint invasion of Poland in which Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler 
agreed to divide up Poland and other sovereign countries in Eastern 
Europe.170  The U.S. must counter the ambitions of territorial expan-
sion by regional and major power by using soft and hard power tac-
tics to differentiate and deter powers to overstep international law. 
In the aftermath of the Cold War the U.S. and Turkey under-
 
168 Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence, 32 (4) WASH. Q. 3, 3, 8 
(OCT. 2009); see generally WALTHER HOFER, DIE ENTFESSELUNG DES ZWEITEN 
WELTKRİEGES: EINES STUDIE UEBER DER INTERNATIONALEN BEZİEHUNGEN IM SOMMER 1939 
MIT DOKUMENTEN (S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1964). 
169 Trenin, supra note 168, at 3-4, 7, 13. 
170 World War II: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, JEWİSH VİRTUAL LİBR.,  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-molotov-ribbentrop-pact-august-1939 (last visited 
May 1, 2017). 
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went profound transformations.  The U.S. rose as a superpower in a 
unipolar world whose policies 25 years later are aimed to consolidate 
its military because it overextended its economic capabilities by ex-
cessive military spending without comparison to any of its rivals, en-
dorsing programs to expand NATO and dispatching forces around the 
world on humanitarian missions.171  After 9/11, Washington enlarged 
these operations to include counterterrorism operations, missile de-
fense programs and construction of more military bases around the 
world.172 
Turkey also began to demonstrate signs of a foreign policy 
from deviating from that of the U.S. under Turkish President Ozal in 
the late 1990s.173  In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
was elected to power with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (prime minister 
2003-2014 and president since 2014), Abdullah Gul (prime minister 
2002-2003, president 2007-14), and  Ahmet Davutoglu (chief advisor 
to Prime Minister Erdogan 2003-2009, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2009-2014, and prime minister  2014 - 2016) succeeded by Binali 
Yıldırım.174 
Davutoglu was the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy 
concept and author of a book called Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic 
Depth).175  Davutoglu advocated a foreign policy doctrine underscor-
ing geographical and historical depth.  Turkey, as a result of its his-
torical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical 
depth putting Turkey in the heartland of many geopolitical areas of 
influence calling for expanded engagement with all its neighbors.  
 
171 Eirik B. Lundestad & Tor G. Jakobsen, A Unipolar World: System and Wars in Three 
Different Military Eras, POPULAR SOCİAL SCİENCE (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/02/05/a-unipolar-world-systems-and-wars-in-
three-different-military-eras/ (last visited May 14, 2017). 
172 James Sterngold, After 9/11, U.S. Policy Built World Bases, SFGATE (Mar. 21, 2004 
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/After-9-11-U-S-policy-built-on-world-bases-
2777808.php. 
173 F. STEPHEN LARRABEE & IAN O. LESSER, TURKİSH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 3 (2003), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1612.html. 
174 Justice and Development Party: Political Party, Turkey, ENCYCLOPEDİA BRİTANNİCA,  
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-Party-political-party-Turkey  
(last visited May 14, 2017). 
175 Turkish foreign policy under the AKP administration has been associated with the 
name of Ahmet Davutoğlu.  Davutoğlu was the chief foreign policy advisor to  Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before he was appointed foreign minister in 2009. Bezen 
Balamir Coskun, The Post-Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, E-INTERNATİONAL 
REL. (June 3, 2016), http://www.e-ir.info/2016/06/03/the-post-davutoglu-era-in-turkish-
foreign-policy/.  As an academic, he has outlined his foreign policy doctrine in several 
writings, most important of which is his book “Strategic Depth.” Id. 
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Davutoglu calls for a reassessment of the role of the U.S. hegemony 
in global affairs and foresees Turkey as a regional power.  When the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2003 refused to ratify a bill 
backed by the AKP government under Turkish Prime Minister Ab-
dullah Gul to allow more than 60,000 U.S. troops to operate from 
Turkish bases and ports in the event of war with Iraq, a position sup-
ported by many other American allies such as France and Germany.  
Gul argued that Iraq posed no imminent threat to the U.S. according 
to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, and many considered this a turning 
point in relations between the U.S. and Turkey.176  While Turkey and 
the U.S. continued to maintain a strategic relationship following the 
invasion of Iraq, anti-American sentiment grew over time, and the 
seeds of then Turkish President Ozal’s Middle Eastern foreign policy 
shifted to an outspoken independent foreign policy with the begin-
ning of the Arab Awakening in 2011.177  At approximately the same 
time, an ambitious project unfolded to construct a warship without 
technological and financial support from a third country that was 
backed by Turkey’s new ruling AKP.  In 2004, Turkey began imple-
mentation of its $3 billion “National Warship” program, known by its 
Turkish abbreviation MİLGEM (national ship).178  Seven years later, 
in September 2011, on the occasion of the commissioning of 
MİLGEM’s first surface combatant, TCG Heybeliada, then Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey’s national interests 
as “residing in the Suez Canal, the adjacent seas, and from there ex-
tending to the Indian Ocean.”179  Turkey’s vision of becoming a re-
gional power unveiled itself with the Arab Awakening by adopting 
multilateral policies often causing friction with the U.S. and its allies, 
which ultimately failed in a zero-sum foreign policy and isolated 
Turkey among its neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean region to-
day. 
Under the AKP, millions of Turks had achieved a middle-
class lifestyle.  Between 2003 and 2013 the AKP overhauled Tur-
key’s social services (education, pensions, health care), opened its 
domestic market to privatization while controlling a hyperinflationary 
 
176 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
177 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
178 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
179 Tanchum, supra note 116. 
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currency, and improved the country’s infrastructure.180  Foreign di-
rect investments jumped eightfold from $15 billion in 1923–2002 to 
$123 billion in ten years.181  Turkey’s leadership provided the coun-
try with economic growth near 10% in the early 2010s, avoiding the 
global financial meltdown.182  Turkey joined the ranks of the G20, 
and by spring 2013 all its debt to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was paid off.183 
In 2012, ten years after 9/11, a newly re-elected President 
Barack Obama initiated a different foreign policy in light of whether 
it furthers, protects, or risks key components of his domestic agenda.  
Moreover, the Obama administration was complacent in challenging 
Russia’s military build-up and criticizing Putin’s internal repression.  
He failed to advocate a robust and viable NATO to deter Russia’s ex-
pansionism as Putin demonstrated in 2008 against Georgia believing 
that he could circumvent Putin by working with Prime Minister 
Medvedev. 
It was not until Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he would 
run for a third term as president and Russia’s subsequent seizure of 
Crimea, followed by the invasion of eastern Ukraine that the Obama 
administration reassessed its policy towards Russia by implementing 
economic sanctions together with European partners and deploying 
military assets to eastern Europe as part of NATO’s deterrence.  The 
objective was to dissuade Russia from a new wave of Russian mili-
tary exercises targeting the Baltic region and preparations for a phony 
Russian-minority uprising in one of the Baltic states or a struggle 
over the rail corridor through Lithuania connecting Kaliningrad and 
 
180 Jules Gray, Turkey Aiming for Huge New Infrastructure Developments, WORLD FİN. 
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/government-
policy/turkey-aiming-for-huge-new-infrastructure-developments. 
181 Turkey’s Secrets To Success, BLOOMBERG MEDIA, 
https://www.bloombergmedia.com/assets/pdfs/custom-publishing/150504_Turkey.pdf (last 
visited May. 2, 2017). 
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the rest of Russia.184  As the Economist observed in December 2012, 
“Mr. Obama and his team believe that his outstanding task is to se-
cure a domestic legacy.  Their fear is that foreign entanglements may 
threaten that goal.”185  In itself retrenchment is a viable policy until 
potential threats in certain regions require greater assets to project 
power and deter others turning into protagonists as evidenced by the 
increasing presence of Chinese and Russian naval activities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean Sea. 
With increased successful explorations for oil and hydrocar-
bons, many countries see an increased need for their military to se-
cure their offshore energy interests and patrol their EEZs by procur-
ing larger and more powerful surface vessels and maritime patrol 
aircraft to accomplish these goals.  Until now the naval fleets in the 
Eastern Mediterranean are still quite small.  Will the geopolitical dy-
namics of the major global powers in the eastern Mediterranean spiral 
into larger regional, national defense expenditures and growing 
mounting tensions among the countries in the region?  Will the unim-
aginable become inevitable as a geopolitical crisis intensifies?  Can 
diplomatic solutions be found through international maritime delimi-
tation agreements as laid down in UNCLOS and the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1958? 
Since the Arab Spring Awakening in 2011, revolutions ush-
ered in hope for a ‘Renaissance’ and despair through “Counterrevolu-
tions.”186  Coup d’états in Egypt, the rise of terrorist led civil wars in 
Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, Iran’s facilitating terrorist activities 
through its aides in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon together with the 
Russian and American military intervention depict the chaotic re-
gional instability.  Russia’s deployment of naval assets, weaponry, 
and air force to the region fills a power vacuum of uncertainty caused 
by former President Obama’s policy of rebalancing the strategic shift 
 
184 Anne Applebaum, Obama and Europe: Missed Signals, Renewed Commitments, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept.–Oct. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/obama-and-
europe. 
185 Lexington: The Obama Doctrine, supra note 158. 
186 Craig Chamberlain, Five Years After the Arab Spring: Despair, but Also Hope, ILL. 
NEWS BUREAU (Jan. 21, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/6367/314234. 
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of gravity to the Asia-Pacific  theatre of operations.187  In recent 
weeks and months, the U.S. has been  recalibrating its military inter-
vention by collaborating more closely with Turkey and other rebel 
groups like the YPG in its military operations to fight ISIL in Syr-
ia.188  President Donald Trump on May 9, 2017 announced his deci-
sion to approve a plan to arm the YPG causing a tumultuous outburst 
of criticism by the Republic of Turkey which fears that these arms 
will eventually fall into the PKK’s hands to be used against Turks.  
How real this fear really is can be better understood in the context of 
a Washington Post article of January 7, 2017 titled: U.S. military aid 
is fuelling big ambitions for Syria’s leftist Kurdish militia.  The report 
says, “the method in which recruits for the PYD are prepped by 
Kurdish instructors before receiving military training from American 
troops [is] to learn and embrace the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan, 
[the PKK] leader imprisoned in Turkey whose group is branded a ter-
rorist organization by both Washington and Ankara.”189  Amazingly, 
“U.S. officials and military advisers in Syria declined to discuss de-
tails of the training being provided to the Arabs in the force,”190 ad-
monishing any knowledge of ideological lessons they receive before 
their military training. While the U.S. Government doesn’t comment, 
“the scene in the classroom captures some of the complexity of the 
U.S.-backed fight against the Islamic State in Syria, where a Kurdish 
movement that subscribes to an ideology at odds with stated U.S. pol-
icy has become America’s closest ally against the extremists.”191  
When the U.S. gave the Taliban in Afghanistan weapons to fight the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s, the same group of fighters became the 
arch enemy of the U.S. a decade later.  How a balanced cooperation 
can be reached in utilizing Turkey’s armed forces and fire power 
while combining the fighting spirit of the YPG to destroy ISIL con-
 
187 Thomas R. Fedyszyn, The Russian Navy ‘Rebalances’ to the Mediterranean, 
139/12/1,330 PROC. MAG (Dec. 2013), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-
12/russian-navy-rebalances-mediterranean. 
188 Tim Arango, Anne Barnard, & Ceylan Yeginsu, Turkey’s Military Plunges Into Syria, 
Enabling Rebels to Capture ISIS Stronghold, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-isis.html?_r=0. 
189 Liz Sly, “U.S. military aid is fueling big ambitions for Syria’s leftist Kurdish militia,” 
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-
military-aid-is-fueling-big-ambitions-for-syrias-leftist-kurdish-militia/2017/01/07/6e457866-
c79f-11e6-acda-59924caa2450_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.9d3608bb9b13 (last 
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tinues to be a major challenge requiring further re-evaluation.  As an-
ti-American sentiment among Turkish civil society grows, reassur-
ances that the military armament supplied to the YPG by the U.S. 
will be returned or accounted for is questionable. 
Before Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine and annexation of 
Crimea on March 18, 2014, Russia played on the financial suscepti-
bility of countries like Greece and Cyprus, a financial hub to launder 
Russian money and a holiday destination, by offering in 2013 both 
countries billions in financial help to manage the country’s debt, 
which was causing social and political instability.192  However, Rus-
sian overtures of funding eventually were curtailed not only because 
of sanctions but also due to the rapid decline in oil prices starting 
mid-2014 causing the Russian economy to sink into recession at the 
beginning of 2015.193  Meanwhile, the economy in Cyprus was re-
covering so that the 2013 financial bailout program of €10 billion to 
Cyprus by the Eurogroup - (European Commission (EC), European 
Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - was 
already being repaid in 2015.194 
Until Russia’s military intervention in September 2015, Rus-
sian ships used Greek-Cypriot ports as alternatives to its Tartus base 
in Syria threatened by the conflict between rebels and the government 
of Bashar al-Assad.195  According to a Reuters newspaper report of  
June 6, 2013, the naval task force consisted of approximately 16 
ships and 3 Marine helicopters, and at times included Russia’s one 
 
192 Ilya Arkhipov & Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Russia Readying Help for Companies With 
Funds Ensnared in Cyprus,” BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2013). 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-27/russia-readying-help-for-companies-
with-funds-ensnared-in-cyprus; Tom Parfitt & Mehreen Khan, “Russia ready to offer Greeks 
cash in return for assets,”,  TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11519651/Russia-ready-to-offer-Greeks-
cash-in-return-for-assets.html. 
193 Ivana Kottasova,  “Russia’s economy has been in recession for 18 months,” 
CNN:MONEY (Aug. 11, 2016)  http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/news/economy/russia-
economy-recession-six-quarters/index.html. . 
194 “Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and troika,” 
EKATHIMERINI(Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-on-
bailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-and-troika (last visited May 15, 2017). 
195 Paul J Saunders, Cyprus Port Deal Gives Russian Navy Alternative to Tartus, AL 
MONİTOR (Mar. 3, 2015) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/russia-
sanctions-europe-nato-economy-cyprus-mediterranean.html. 
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aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov.196  Russian officials claimed 
that this presence would contribute to the fight against terrorism and 
piracy in the region.  Russia has used its navy to evacuate Russian 
citizens from Syria amid the violence there.  However, the increase in 
Russian naval presence together with the first joint naval war games 
in European waters with China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) combined exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, comes at a 
time when the West’s relations with Russia are at their tensest since 
the end of the Cold War.  Much as the Royal Navy projected power 
in the 19th century by cruising in the Far East, “the Russian and Chi-
nese fleets’ project power in European waters” by sailing in the Med-
iterranean Sea.197  The combined naval exercises with the Russians 
enhance China’s ambitions to transform its country into a modern, 
maritime power capable of challenging the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific 
theatre and elsewhere in the world.  The Chinese issued a white paper 
on May 27, 2015, signalling that China intends to project its military 
power beyond its immediate periphery, into the open ocean, in pur-
suit of ‘national rejuvenation’ aimed at countering what Chinese 
leaders see as U.S.-led efforts to check China’s rise.198  The docu-
ment marks a remarkable transition from China’s hands-off approach 
to global affairs to a reorientation of economic development towards 
a national tenacity in defending the global scope of Chinese interests 
even through the use of force.199 
The U.S. could do considerably more to counteract these ac-
tions with sophisticated, multidimensional, multilateral, and ambi-
tious efforts of its own.  It could adopt a much more comprehensive 
and well-coordinated strategy aimed at resolving delimitation bound-
ary issues by initiating a “joint development regime” based on the 
following criteria. 
 
196 Alexei Anishchuk, Russia Announces Permanent Mediterranean Naval Presence, 
REUTERS (June 6, 2013 4:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-navy-
mediterranean-idUSBRE95515I20130606 (last visited May 25, 2015). 
197 Holmes, supra note 26; see also id. 
198 Lauren Dickey & Stephen E. Liszewski, Five Takeaways from China’s Bold, New 
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X. CASE FOR AN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN DELIMITATION 
PROGRAM 
As the delimitation should be effected to reach an equitable 
result,200 the equitable character of the delimitation needs to be exam-
ined in each and every case.  Thus, the consideration of relevant cir-
cumstances becomes essential.  In fact, there are a number of relevant 
circumstances, which are divided into two groups, geographical and non-
geographical factors.201  Those factors will be examined relating to the 
Eastern Mediterranean Sea. 
Regarding the maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean some of the factors will affect the location of the maritime 
boundary line such as regional geography, including economic 
factors; security and navigational factors; general characteristics; and 
particular features of the region (i.e., ocean, semi-enclosed sea); con-
figurations of coasts; proportionality; presence of islands; and espe-
cially islands ‘on the wrong side.’ 
Previous decisions and practice will point at best to the kinds 
of factors to be considered and approaches to be adopted, but will not 
permit the deduction of a precise boundary line that must be estab-
lished.202 
The analysis of the conceptual nature and relationships of the 
continental shelf and EEZ leads to the conclusion that the EEZ 
boundary will tend to follow the continental shelf boundary.  For this 
reason, this consideration will concentrate on circumstances relevant 
to continental shelf delimitation.  Except for geological and geomor-
phologic factors the same range of conditions would have potential 
relevance for both because the width of the Eastern Mediterranean 
Sea is less than 400 miles. 
A. Relevant Area 
To achieve an equitable solution, all factors in the relevant ar-
 
200 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 74, 83. 
201 U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAI-
RS, HANDBOOK ON THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 25-46, U.N. Sales No. 
E.01.V.2 (2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
202 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 182. 
56
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/10
2017 RETHINKING EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY 883 
ea have to be taken considered.  The sine qua non of delimitation is 
the basic and often unarticulated premise that there must be an area 
over which each party in dispute claims sole jurisdiction. 
Both the 1958 Convention203 and 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention204 imply the area to be delimited.  The relevant area is im-
portant in a case of adjudication.  Both the judgments of the ICJ and 
the awards of arbitral tribunals contain at the beginning of their find-
ings a general description of the area in which the delimitation opera-
tion is to be carried out.205  The recourse to the relevant area is mainly 
useful when dealing with the proportionality exercise. 
In this context, looking at the Eastern Mediterranean, being a 
part of a semi-closed sea, the coastal length of the coastal state is im-
portant.  As part of “relevant circumstances,” it will affect the loca-
tion of the boundary in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
B. Configuration of the Coasts 
In the case of maritime law, the role of the coastal geography 
is dominant when applying delimitation, which is based on two core 
principles: “[t]he land dominates the sea, and it dominates it by the 
intermediary of the coastal front . . . .”206  This has been underscored 
in all of the relevant decisions, i.e., in the Libya-Malta case; in the 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case; and in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
case.207  On configuration of the coast, it may be possible to point to 
three factors to be examined: 
 
 
203 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 6. 
204 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 83. 
205 The Court in its 1985 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – Malta case stated: “It is appropriate to 
begin with a general description of the geographical context of the dispute before the Court . 
. . define in geographical terms the area which is relevant to the delimitation and the area in 
dispute between the Parties.” HANDBOOK, supra note 201, at 26.  In the Anglo – French 
Case, the Court stated: “The area of continental shelf with which the court is concerned . . . 
forms part of the continental shelf of North-West Europe.” Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French 
Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. 3, ¶ 2, at 18 (Mar. 14, 1978), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf.E.U. 
206 Prosper Weil, Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation, in  I 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,  at 115. 
207 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 68, at 
50 (June 3, 1985), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf; The Delimination of the 
Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), 19 
R.I.A.A. 149, ¶ 124, at 194 (Feb. 14, 1985), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XIX/149-
196.pdf. 
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(1) Opposite or adjacent coast; 
 
(2) Concavity or convexity of coast; and 
 
(3) The general direction of coastline. 
 
In this context, when the Eastern Mediterranean Sea is con-
sidered, the general direction of the coast of the littoral Sates may be 
decisive in a delimitation agreement.  For example, the agreement be-
tween Greek Cypriot and Egypt in the area of the west of the islands 
ignored Turkey’s continental shelf rights and excluded Turkey from 
the region.  Likewise, in the same area, Turkey’s coastal configura-
tion has projections toward Libya.  Therefore, Turkey may sign a de-
limitation agreement between Egypt and Libya as well in this region. 
C. Proportionality 
Proportionality is one of the most important relevant factors 
that is often taken into account in the maritime delimitation.208  Mari-
time delimitation should consider the ratio of the maritime spaces at-
tributed to each Party and the respective coastal lengths.  These ratios 
mainly involve the determination of the length of relevant coastlines 
and the water areas to be attributed.  However, in many cases, it may 
be difficult to determine the area to be used.  However, in the case of 
the Eastern Mediterranean, there is no disagreement concerning the 
relevant area to be delimited. 
In the beginning, ICJ accepted the concept of proportionality 
as a final factor to correct inequities produced by the equidistance 
method, only in the context of a concave or convex coast.209  Fur-
thermore, the international courts and tribunal enlarged the function 
 
208 Jonathan I. Charney, The Delimitation of Ocean Boundaries 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L 
L. 497, 515 (1987). 
209 “A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a reasonable degree of propor-
tionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring about 
between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned . . . .” North 
Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germa-
ny/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 98 (Feb. 20, 1969), 
http://www.internationalcourts.net/node/131. 
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of proportionality geographically210 and functionally.211  Thus, pro-
portionality has played a double role in the case law: as a test of equi-
ty and a justification for shifting first equidistance lines.212 
The use of proportionality in State practice remains excep-
tional.  In fact, only a few agreements involve maritime delimitation.  
In this context, a typical example is the 1974 Agreement between 
France and Spain in the Bay of Biscay.213  Another example is the 
1992 Protocol Supplementary to the Agreement between the United 
Kingdom and Ireland of September 7, 1988.214  The authors also ob-
serve that it is hard to assess whether, and to what extent, this factor 
played a role in any specific delimitation agreement.215 
 
210 In the Tunisia/Libya case, the I.C.J. relied on proportionality when delimiting between 
adjacent coasts, although there was no situation of concavity or convexity. Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 131 (Feb. 24), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6267.pdf.  In some cases, proportionality was 
considered in delimitation between States with opposite coasts. See Award of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) Eritrea/Yemen, 22 
R.I.A.A. 335, ¶ 165-168 (Dec. 17, 1999), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/3 35-
410.pdf; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 38, ¶ 61-69 (June 14, 1993), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/78/6743.pdf; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 68, 74-75 (June 3, 1985), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 184-85 (Oct. 
12, 1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/6369.pdf.  Proportionality was also taken 
into account in some cases where the geographical situations differ from the original 
situation in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment. See Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61, ¶ 210-16 (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf; Arbitration Between Barbados and the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Continental Shelf Between them, Decision, 27 R.I.A.A. 147, ¶ 337-38 (Apr. 
11, 2006), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/147-251.pdf. 
211 Proportionality was to be applied as a test of the equitableness of the suggested 
delimitation line. See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 
I.C.J. at ¶ 103; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶ 
58.  In other instance, proportionality was used as a factor for shifting provisionally drawn 
equidistance lines. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at ¶ 222. 
212 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 201 (2012). 
213 Report Number No. 9-2, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,  
at 1723. 
214 Report Number No. 9-5(2), in III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 
14,  at 2487. 
215 Weil, Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14 , at 129. 
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One category of factors that has been regarded from the very 
beginning as constituting “relevant circumstances” in the context of 
equidistance is the presence of islands.216  The coastal configurations 
of states are quite commonly complicated, or even distorted, by off-
shore features such as islands, rocks, and reefs.  These features affect 
maritime delimitation in different ways.217  However, it is evident, 
however, that not all islands218 can be treated as potential relevant cir-
cumstances.  Only islands politically integrated into a mainland state that 
is itself involved in the delimitation can be deemed to be relevant circum-
stances.219  In the Anglo-French Case, the “nature” of islands was a cen-
tral issue taken account of by the Court as being relevant considerations 
in determining the extent of their influence on the boundary.220 
Different factors may be considered when dealing with islands.  
In general, there are many examples of State practice in which islands 
have been given full effect, half effect, or reduced effect, and also no ef-
fect in the case of delimitation between islands and mainlands or between 
islands only.  Sometimes other factors, such as the size of the islands and 
distance, come into play.  In some situations, no effect has been granted 
to an island because its sovereignty was disputed.221  “In some other cas-
 
216 Islands have been regarded from the very beginning as constituting “special 
circumstances” in the context of equidistance. HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF 
ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1989). 
217 Derek Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitations, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,  at 131. 
218 There are numerous examples of islands, as the sole unit of entitlement, i.e., Malta, 
Cuba, being given separate entitlement and full weight as against mainland coasts. Id. at 133.  
In this context, Malta is an exception of full effect.  In Libya/Malta case, Malta, as an island 
state, was not given full effect vis-à-vis the opposite, mainland Libyan coast.  The factor that 
dictated the Court`s holding was proportionality. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶ 58. 
219 EVANS, supra note 114, at 135. 
220 Delimitation of the Contintental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 171, at 84. 
221 In the 1969 Agreement between Iran and Qatar, the island of Halul was ignored, 
because of its disputed status, in constructing the mainland-to-mainland equidistant line. 
Report Number No. 7-6, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 
1511.  Another solution, adopted in the 1986 Agreement between Burma (Myanmar) and 
India, is to acknowledge the sovereignty of India but reduce the effect of the island of 
Norcondam. Report Number No. 6-3, in II INTERNATİONAL MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra 
note 14, at 1329. 
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es, islands have also been ignored222 in some instance because of the 
method of delimitation used.”223  International courts and tribunals are to 
decide the effect given to islands within the framework of equitable prin-
ciples.  In analyzing the case law and State practice to specify islands’ ef-
fect in drawing a maritime boundary, it would be appropriate to use an 
analytical framework categorizing islands into several groups.  In this re-
spect, their geographical location provides a useful criterion.  Based on 
the geographical location according to the coast, islands may be catego-
rized into four groups: (1) offshore islands; (2) off-lying islands (de-
tached islands); (3) islands in the median zone; and (4) islands ‘on the 
wrong side.’224 
When considering the islands in the Eastern Mediterranean in 
this context, the Greek islands are categorized as  ‘on the wrong side’  
separating the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean such as Crete, 
Rhodes, Karpathos and Strongli as well as an island state like Cyprus. 
1. Islands  ‘On the Wrong Side.’ 
In this regard, islands ‘on the wrong side’ are located at a dis-
tance from the mainland of the state under whose sovereignty they lie, 
and proximate to the coast under a different sovereignty (i.e., a Greek is-
land Meis/Kastellorizo near to Kaş a town in the province of Antalya in 
Turkey).  In this category, the most important factor is the position of a 
feature.  It will often determine whether it will affect the choice or merely 
the application of the method.  The position is often the crux of the issue.  
In such a situation where islands lie  ‘on the wrong side’ of a line, a court, 
in choosing a boundary, may give them their small enclaves225 of the 
continental shelf without modifying the provisional boundary line.  This 
idea perhaps comes from Whittemore Boggs in his writing in 1951 and 
the adherents of the equidistant or median line would also follow Boggs’ 
suggestion above although they would ignore small islands and islets ly-
 
222 The 1981 Agreement between Brazil and France uses an azimuth of 41⁰30’, thus 
ignoring the island of Le Grand Connetable off the coast of Guiana. Report Number No. 3-3, 
in I INTERNATİONAL MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra note 14, at 771. 
223 HANDBOOK, supra note 201, ¶ 160, at 34. 
224 For another geographical categorization, see Bowet, supra note 217, at 131.  For the 
typology of islands with respect to their effect in drawing a maritime boundary, see TANAKA, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204-05. 
225 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 205.  In this 
situation, the concerned states may opt to ignore the islands altogether for the purposes of 
constructing an overall division between their mainland coastlines. TANAKA, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204. 
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ing ‘on the wrong side’ of the median or equidistant line.226  This was 
done in the cases dealing with the Channel Islands in the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf case and with the St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands in the 
St. Pierre and Miquelon case.  These two cases are therefore crucial. 
In the Anglo-French case,227 the Court of Arbitration228 consid-
ered the effect of the Channel Islands, which are under British sovereign-
ty and lie only 6.6 miles off the French coast.  Court of Arbitration 
adopted a two-fold solution.  First, as the primary boundary, the Court 
drew a median line between the mainlands of the two States.  Second, it 
created a 12-mile enclave to the north and west of the Channel Islands. 
In this regard, another crucial case is the St. Pierre and Miquelon 
case.229  Central to the dispute was a small group of Islands and islets un-
der French sovereignty, far from France, and close to the Canadian coasts 
of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  In this case, the Tribunal considered 
that “[g]eographical features are at the heart of the delimitation 
process,”230 and has drawn a mushroom shape as a delimitation line.231  
“Regarding the cap of the mushroom, the [Tribunal] established a 24-
mile enclave . . .232 around St-Pierre and Miquelon” by a radial projec-
 
226 See generally S. Whittemore Boggs, Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under National 
Jurisdiction, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 240 (1951). 
When a median line passes very near islands in the middle of lake or gulf 
(or even traverses some islands), if any island can be found to be ‘on the 
wrong side of the median line boundary’ (that is, if an island of clearly 
established sovereignty is in the water of another State), the alternatives 
appear to be: (1) Agree to shift the jurisdiction line from the exact medi-
an line, to accommodate the island in question; or (2) Agree that the 
State which has sovereignty over the island shall exercise jurisdiction 
over it (presumably including its normal belt of territorial sea) without 
regard to the median line. 
Id. at 258-59; see also KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND MARITIME 
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 94 (1987). 
227 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶  201-02, at 94-95. 
228 See generally Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES 
AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1. 
229 Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Mique-
lon), 11 R.I.A.A. 265, (June 10, 1992), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/265-341.pdf. 
230 Id. at ¶ 24, at 1160. 
231 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 200-01. 
232 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, PREDICTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE LAW OF MARITIME 
DELIMITATION 199 (2006).  The Tribunal determined to the west of the islands a limited 
EEZ of 12 miles from the outer limit of the territorial sea with respect to the westward de-
limitation.  The Court of Arbitration “grant[ed]” an additional 12 miles for the EEZ. De-
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tion233 without providing any continental shelf or EEZ to the east of the 
islands concerned.  In sum, the Tribunal gave in his decision to St-Pierre 
and Miquelon three kinds of effect: (1) “partial effect” in the west of St-
Pierre and Miquelon; (2) “enclaving with no effect” in the east of St-
Pierre and Miquelon; and (3) “full-effect” in the northwest and the south 
of St-Pierre and Miquelon.234 
State practice, regarding islands located ‘on the wrong side,’ sug-
gests establishing an arc of a determinate distance as the common solu-
tion.235  There is little doubt that the enclave solution purports to elimi-
nate the distorting effect of equidistance lines.  The 1968 Agreement236 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia draws a 12-mile arc on the Saudi Arabian 
side of Farsi Island, which belongs to Iran.  In the 1971 Agreement237 be-
tween Italy and Tunisia, drawing a continental shelf boundary, the Italian 
island of Lampione, Lampedusa, and a 12-mile arc surrounded by Pantel-
leria are on the Tunisian side.  “The 1993 Agreement between Colombia 
and Jamaica also provides an intriguing solution in that it creates a 12-
mile enclave around Colombia’s keys on Serranilla and Baja Nuevo.” 238 
This raises difficult questions regarding the effect of the islands of one 
State on the coast of another State.  For instance, such difficulties were 
dealt with in the 1978 Agreement239 between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea where the Australian islands of Boigu and Saibai lie within 3-4 
miles off the coast of Papua New Guinea.  On the landward side, facing 
the coast where the distance is less than 6 miles, a clear equidistance line 
was established.  On the seaward side, however, the territorial seas of all 
15 Australian islands lying to the north of the seabed jurisdiction line, in-
 
limitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 11 
R.I.A.A. at ¶ 69, at 1170. 
233 Id.  With respect to the stem of the mushroom, the 200-mile corridor was created 
based on the theory of frontal projection. Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada 
and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 11 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 70, at 1170. 
234 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204-05. 
235 However, there are some agreements which were given full effect to islands. See 
Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimita-
tions, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 144-47. 
236 Report Number No. 7-7, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 1519. 
237 Report Number No. 8-6, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 1611. 
238 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 213; see also 
Report Number No. 2-18, in III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 
2179. 
239 Report Number No. 5-3, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 
929. 
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cluding Boigu and Saibai, were restricted to a 3-mile territorial sea arc.240 
In the light of these judgments and agreements, islands in the 
Eastern Mediterranean will be a relevant factor.  In this context, mari-
time delimitation between Turkey and Greece should be between the 
mainlands of both countries in the semi-enclosed sea and the Greek 
island on the wrong side should not be given a continental shelf or an 
EEZ except for its territorial waters due to its geographical position 
on the opposite side. 
2. Island State 
The 1985 Malta/Libya Case is an example of these types of 
islands.  In the Libya/Malta case, Malta, as an island state, was not 
given full effect vis-à-vis the opposite, mainland Libyan coast.241  In 
this context, Cyprus as an island state is similar to Malta in the Medi-
terranean.  As a matter of fact, the median line, which has been drawn 
in the agreement demarcating the continental shelf between the is-
land’s northern coast and Turkey, was adjusted for Turkey towards 
Cyprus. 
E. Security and Navigation Factors 
The direct influence of these factors on maritime delimitation 
in the case of continental shelf242 and EEZ remains somewhat un-
clear.  In fact, there is little evidence that maritime boundaries were 
established to reflect security and navigation interests.243  However, 
 
240 Treaty Between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea Concerning 
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the two Countries, Including the 
Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, signed 18 December 1978, 1986 ATS 4 
(entered in to force 15 February 1985), art 3, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1985/4.html. 
241 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I.C.J. 13. 
242 Theoretically, navigation has little relationship to the institution of the continental 
shelf.  As with Article 3 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 78(1) of 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention stipulates: “The rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of the air space 
above those waters.” UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 3. 
243 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra note 14,  at 22. 
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the right to “freedom of navigation” in EEZ is “subject to the rele-
vant provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,”244 and ac-
cordingly, unlike navigation on the high seas, States prefer to avoid 
situations where a navigational route of high strategic relevance will 
come under the jurisdiction of another coastal State, i.e., Aegean Sea.  
There are nevertheless aspects of these regimes that States may per-
ceive as affecting their security interests.245  Therefore, “States may 
desire to ensure that specific navigation routes are within their wa-
ters, or at least outside the waters of the neighboring state.”246  More-
over, there is a belief that particular navigable channels should be 
taken into account in any delimitation.247 
Some cases before the ICJ and an arbitral tribunal, respective-
ly, interpreted security as proximity to the coasts by two of the States 
pleading in those cases.  The ICJ, in the Libya/Malta case, regarded 
security factors as a relevant circumstance; however, it did not affect 
the location of the continental shelf boundary because the delimita-
tion line drawn by the Court was “not so near to the coast of either 
Party as to raise questions of security as a particular consideration in 
the present case.”248  The same applied to the Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau,249 Greenland/Jan Mayen,250 and Romania/ Ukraine251 cases. 
In State practice, some agreements take into account the con-
sideration of security and navigation factors.  In the 1988 Agree-
 
244 Article 58(3) of the Convention prescribes that, “in exercising their rights . . . States 
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the 
laws and regulations adopted by that State in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention and other rules of international law.” UNCLOS, supra note 14,  at Art. 58(3). 
245 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 23. 
246 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 26. 
247 EVANS, supra note 114, at 179. 
248 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶ 51. 
249 The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau 
(Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), 19 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 124, at 252 (accepting that security factors 
might be relevant circumstances; however, the Arbitration Court also held that they would 
not affect the conclusion). 
250 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. at ¶ 81, at 74-75 (discarding Norway’s argument requiring 
protection since the boundary to be established was not sufficiently near Jan Mayen’s coast to 
create a security problem). 
251 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 
at ¶ 204, at 128 (“The provisional equidistance line determined by the Court fully respects 
the legitimate security interests of either Party.  Therefore, there is no need to adjust the line 
on the basis of this consideration.”). 
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ment252 between Sweden and the former Soviet Union, the island 
Gotland, which has a Curial role in the national defense system of 
Sweden, influenced delimitation.  In the 1980 Agreement253 between 
Norway and Iceland, security considerations influenced Norway’s 
concession for Iceland accepting its full 200-mile EEZ.  Furthermore, 
agreements contain specific clauses to protect maritime interests.  For 
instance, the 1978 Agreement254 between the Netherlands (Antilles) 
and Venezuela made detailed provisions on the right of transit pas-
sage and the 1990 Agreement255 between Trinidad, Tobago, and Ven-
ezuela specifies the right of transit passage through the Strait con-
cerned.256 
In sum, security and navigation, according to these decisions 
and agreements, become relevant in association with the decision-
makers power to shift a provisional line to reflect equity, taking into 
consideration the distance between the two states.257 
F. Economic Factors: Joint Maritime Development 
Regime 
The economic value of any natural resources is a dominant el-
ement in the eyes of the parties,258 and this is reflected in bilateral 
agreements.  Though the Courts recognize the parties’ concerns, they 
do not place much weight upon the location of natural resources 
 
252 Report Number No. 10-9, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 2057. 
253 Report Number No. 9-4, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITİME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 1755. 
254 Report Number No. 2-12, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 615. 
255 Report Number No. 2-13(3), in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 
14, at 675. 
256 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 126. 
257 FARAJ ABDULLAH AHNISH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND 
THE PRACTICE OF STATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 100 (1993). 
258 Robert W. Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States 71 GEOGRAPHICAL 
REV. 396, 410 (1981) (explaining that R. W. Smith, the one-time chief officer of the U.S. 
Office of the Geographer, Department of State, in case of the negotiation of boundary 
delimitation by agreement stated that, “Attention must be given to unique characteristics of 
each environment, as well as to other factors such as coastal configurations, resource 
locations and marine uses”); EVANS, supra note 114, at 198. 
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when drawing boundaries.259  Regarding natural resources related to 
continental shelf, some judgments have considered natural resources 
as relevant but did not take them into account when creating maritime 
boundaries, i.e., the North Sea Continental Shelf,260 Tunisia/Libya,261 
and Libya/Malta262 cases. 
Also, State practice involving economic factors usually have 
not directly affected the location of boundaries although economic 
considerations played a decisive role in some agreements.  In the 
1969 Agreement263 between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
(Abu Dhabi), the boundary line was drawn to coincide with the loca-
tion of the al-Bunduq oilfield.  In the 1958 Agreement264 between 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the boundary was delimited so as to coin-
cide with the limits of the oil field.  The 1988 Agreement265 between 
Sweden and the former Soviet Union is a typical example of fishery 
resources.  In the 1978 Agreement266 between the Netherlands (Antil-
les) and Venezuela, the boundary was drawn to preserve the jurisdic-
tion of the Netherlands on the west side of Aruba, which had poten-
tial hydrocarbon deposits.  In the 1989 Agreement267 between 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, the equidistance line was modi-
fied in the Columbus Channel and in the southeastern sector for the 
purpose of preserving the integrity of the existing oil fields. 
 
259 Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, supra note 258, at 401.  
260 See generally North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (considering the 
presence of natural resources as a relevant circumstance, but rejected the argument referring 
to natural resources as the concept of a just and equitable share). 
261 See generally Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 
I.C.J. 18.  The court regarded natural resources as relevant circumstances; however, it did 
not come into play in the process of delimitation. Id. at ¶ 107, at 77-78. 
262 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I.C.J. 13.  The court indicated that natural resources could be relevant circumstances “so far 
as known or readily ascertainable.” Id. at ¶ 50, at 41.  When drawing a continental shelf 
boundary, however, it was based solely on geographical factors, and economic 
considerations played no role in the judgment since little information had been given relating 
to natural resources. Id. at ¶ 50, at 41. 
263 Report Number No. 8-7, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,  
at 1541. 
264 Report Number No. 7-3, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,  
at 1499. 
265 In this agreement fisheries were the vital issue. Report Number No. 10-9, in II 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 2957. 
266 Report Number No. 2-12, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, 
at 615. 
267 Report Number No. 2-13(2), in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 
14,  at 655. 
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Besides these agreements above, in cases where States have 
been unable to establish a maritime boundary for various political, 
geographical or legal reasons, and State practice has adopted flexible 
solutions in this field:  ‘joint development zones.’ 
The International Court of Justice observed in The North Sea 
Cases that a regime of joint jurisdiction or exploitation was an option 
for States where delimitation efforts produced overlapping claims to 
areas of natural resources.268  Many more joint development agree-
ments have emerged since the ICJ made that observation. 
On the other hand, articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention provide that if countries fail to agree on delimitation, 
they should develop provisional arrangements of a practical nature.  
Article 123 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provides in part 
that States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, such as the 
Mediterranean Sea, should cooperate in the exercise of their rights 
and the performance of their duties under this Convention. 
1. The Characteristics of a Joint Maritime 
Development Regime 
Joint development regime should exhibit certain characteris-
tics.  “First, it should be between States, rather than between a State 
and a private firm or between private companies.” Second, each State 
party may convey some of its sovereign rights to a supra-national au-
thority that is responsible for regulating the zone. 
        The third element of a joint development regime 
is its concern with exploration for and exploitation of 
natural resources on the continental shelf, as well as 
the living resources and other uses of superjacent wa-
ters . . . . 
        Many of the joint maritime regimes have been es-
tablished as provisional measures, as opposed to final 
settlements.269 
 
268 North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den; Fed. Republic of Ger./Neth.), 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. at ¶ 99. 
269 Yücel Acer, A Proposal for a Joint Maritime Development Regime in the Aegean Sea, 
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 55 (2006). 
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2. Designing a Joint Development Area 
The factors relevant to defining a joint development area may 
limit its extent to only some part of a whole maritime area.  A key 
factor is the location of a known natural resource that straddles a 
boundary or an area of overlapping claims.  In some cases, the possi-
bility of finding a common resource was enough incentive for States 
to establish a regime. 
The precedents make it clear that overlapping claims 
are another relevant factor [for States to establish a re-
gime] . . . . In the Malaysia-Thailand Agreement, for 
instance, the area of overlapping claims was the key 
factor.  The Sudan-Saudi Arabia Agreement estab-
lished a joint regime covering the middle section, 
which could have been the area of conflicting claims 
in case of a delimitation attempt.270 
In some instances where the countries disagreed on the exact 
location of a boundary previously determined by a third party, they 
eventually agreed on a joint development regime to overcome re-
maining disagreements. 
There are other factors.  In all of these examples, the joint de-
velopment areas cover only a designated section of the whole mari-
time area. 
3. Maritime Joint Development Regime 
It is up to the parties to decide what level of cooperation is 
appropriate through a joint regime.  Many factors affect their choice, 
including their expectations and the characteristics of the area in geo-
graphical, political, and legal terms.271 
XI. THE ARCTIC MODEL 
The Arctic Council serves as a model of a Maritime Joint De-
velopment Regime.  The organization established on September 19, 
1996, with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration gives the Arctic 
 
270 MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS IN RELATION 
TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION, in 2 MARITIME BRIEFING 30 (Clive Schofield eds., 
1999). 
271 Acer, supra note 269, at 55-56. 
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Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum a broad mandate to 
address issues of relevance to the Arctic Region and its peoples; in 
particular, matters of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.272  The eight member states: Canada, Den-
mark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States joined 
with six organizations as Permanent Participants representing the 
Arctic Indigenous peoples273 together produced many ground-
breaking studies dealing with a range of environmental issues, safety, 
and the protection of indigenous cultures.  In recent years, the Arctic 
Council plays a significant role in resolving matters in the Arctic.  It 
adopted legally binding agreements in 2011 about search and rescue 
collaboration and coordinated response efforts in the Arctic and 2013 
marine pollution incidents.274  China and other non-Arctic Asian 
countries, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed interest 
in gaining observer status.275 
 
272 The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder, ARCTİC COUNCIL (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited May 15, 2017). 
273 Id.  Six international organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples have 
permanent participant status: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International 
Association, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and Saami Council. Id. 
274 Id. 
275 The Growing Importance of the Arctic Council, STRATFOR (May 17, 2013), 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/growing-importance-arctic-council.  Twelve non-Arctic 
countries have been admitted as observers to the Arctic Council: China (admitted May 
2013), France (admitted October 2000), Germany (admitted September 1998), India 
(admitted May 2013), Italy (admitted May 2013), Japan (admitted May 2013), The 
Netherlands (admitted September 1998), Poland (admitted September 1998), Singapore 
(admitted May 2013), South Korea (admitted May 2013), Spain (admitted October 2006), 
United Kingdom (admitted September 1998). Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (July 28, 2016), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers.  Nine inter-
governmental and inter-parliamentary organisations have been given observer status: Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (admitted October 2000), Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature (admitted October 2000), Nordic Council of 
Ministers (admitted September 1998), Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (admitted 
November 2004), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (admitted October 2000), 
Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (admitted September 
1998), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (admitted October 2002), United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Europe (admitted September 1998), United Nations Envi-
ronment Program (UNEP) (admitted September 1998). Id.  Eleven non-governmental 
organizations are observers to the Arctic Council: Advisory Committee on Protection of the 
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Due to the climate change and melting of Arctic polar glaci-
ers, trading routes providing Europe with increased access to Asia’s 
markets are becoming now more accessible as well as vast reserves 
of oil, gas, and minerals under the Arctic Ocean.276  It means that ge-
opolitical matters have become eminently important in the Arctic re-
gion. As the Arctic region becomes ever more economically viable, 
the Arctic Council is becoming a forum to sort out the implications of 
the environmental changes.  As member states attempt to prove that 
their continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nm limit from their 
coastlines, overlapping EEZ boundary claims disputes are rising.  
Disputes have emerged in the South China Sea or Eastern Mediterra-
nean region over reefs and several rocks located between Canada and 
Greenland, Chukchi Seas and Bering Seas between the U.S. and Rus-
sia, and between Denmark and Canada the Hans Island and the Lin-
coln Sea.  Despite these international maritime claims the Arctic 
Council has maintained a zone of peace and stability.  Also disputed 
are waterways like the Northwest Passage viewed by Canada as a na-




Seas (ACOPS) (admitted October 2000), Arctic Cultural Gateway (admitted November 
2004), Association of World Reindeer Herders (admitted October 2000), Circumpolar 
Conservation Union (admitted October 2000), International Arctic Science Committee 
(IASC) (admitted September 1998), International Arctic Social Sciences Association 
(admitted October 2002), International Union for Circumpolar Health (admitted September 
1998), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (admitted October 2002), Northern 
Forum (admitted September 1998), University of the Arctic (admitted November 2004), 
World Wide Fund for Nature—Global Arctic Program (WWF) (admitted September 1998). 
Id. 
276 UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report, at 28 (Jan. 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69487/pb1369
8-climate-risk-assessment.pdf  “According to the International Energy Agency’s 2013 World 
Energy Outlook, ‘the Arctic likely contains the world’s largest remaining area of 
conventional, undiscovered oil and natural gas, estimated at 13 percent of recoverable oil 
and 30 percent of recoverable natural gas resources.’ ” SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ARTIC, 
RESPONDING TO A CHANGING ARTIC, REPORT, 2014-5, HL 118, ¶ 78, at 32 (UK). 
277 Jill Mahoney, Canadians Rank Arctic Sovereignty as Top Foreign-Policy Priority, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadians-rank-arctic-
sovereignty-as-top-foreign-policy-priority/article563348/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2011). 
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Figure-7: Arctic Circle 
 
 
278 The Roar of Ice Cracking, ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571127-will-asian-countries-consolidate-
or-disrupt-arctic-stability-roar-ice-cracking (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
72
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/10
2017 RETHINKING EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY 899 
279 
Figure-8: Arctic Circle 
 
In the 2013 “Vision for the Arctic,” Ministers of the Arctic 
States wrote: “We are confident that there is no problem that we can-
not solve together through our cooperative relationships with existing 
international law and good will.”280 This commitment was reaffirmed 
in (2011), Kiruna (2013), and Iqaluit (2015).  Each of the Ministers 
of Arctic States recognized that constructive cooperation among the 
 
279 Arctic Region, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook//graphics/ref_maps/political/jpg/arctic_region.jpg (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
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members of the Arctic Council is essential to maintaining peace and 
stability. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Not all joint development agreements have been successful in 
cooperatively utilizing the natural resources of a maritime area, but 
exploitation is not the only benefit of such agreements.  They can 
abate a delimitation dispute and create a friendlier atmosphere facili-
tating settlement of other maritime disputes and critical human secu-
rity issues. 
These benefits will no doubt be realized if a joint develop-
ment regime is established in the Eastern Mediterranean and China 
Seas.  Attention, therefore, ought to be turned to identifying an ap-
propriate regime.  The analyses of State practice above demonstrate 
that there are various options, some of which may be well suited to 
the area and acceptable to the parties. 
Cooperation among the different parties needs to be compre-
hensive.  The parties should jointly establish an organizational struc-
ture for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in 
the seabed, sharing the coasts and revenues in proportion to various 
factors.  In order to reduce tensions and improve the environment for 
negotiations, Washington should work behind the scenes to promote 
and organize an effort for a joint exploration of seabed resources 
without prejudice to sovereignty, as has already been done by Malay-
sia and Thailand (1979), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), and Malaysia 
and Brunei (2009).281  With the U.S. adopting a much more pro-
active, comprehensive, and well-coordinated global energy security 
strategy aimed at resolving international maritime boundary disputes 
and improving human security, allies together with other powers 
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean and China Sea regions.  The U.S. could complement the ambi-
tions of regional pivotal or major powers by supporting international 
 
281 America’s Security Role in the South China Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Asia and the Pacific of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. (July 23, 2015) 
(statement of Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Asia Program, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ FA05/20150723/ 
103787/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-SwaineM-20150723.pdf  (last visited Oct. 10, 2015). 
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maritime law arbitration as a gateway to address broader human secu-
rity issues such as the migration of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in 
central Europe.  Finally, the U.S. could become a party to UNCLOS 
clearly servicing U.S. national security, economic, and environmental 
interests while advocating a “Joint Maritime Development Regime,” 
modelled after the Arctic Council where the organization would arbi-
trate maritime boundary disputes by sorting out the implications of 
the EEZ claims of international law. 
As an intergovernmental organization, the Arctic Council ba-
ses its work on consensus building among the member states when 
possible and not the International Court of Justice, which the U.S. 
tends not to favor for its disputes let alone for other disputes and a 
reason for not joining UNCLOS.  Moreover, many of the member 
states of the Arctic Circle as in the Eastern Mediterranean and China 
Sea regions are signatories to the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention prone to using international adjudication by calling on 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration (PCS) to settle disputes.  America’s differentiation from coun-
tries like Russia and others can best be demonstrated by the insist-
ence on a government by laws rather than by personal ambitions.  
With the U.S. government supporting such a strategy, the security 
providers—specifically the states in the region – would invest the 
time and resources to resolve international maritime disputes as a 
prospect for cooperation in the field of energy and a panacea for im-
proving human security.  U.S. involvement would assist countries in 
the region in tackling Islamist terrorist threats from the eastern shores 
among them ISIL, reduce the escalation of tensions in the area from 
becoming an international crisis, and help develop a common strate-
gic, economic and political identity.  This positive impact would pro-
vide part of a solution to the Eastern Mediterranean challenges to fa-
cilitate the region’s becoming one of the key areas for global security 
in the context of a diversified energy hub for the Eastern Mediterra-
nean region and Europe’s energy security.  Many of the problems af-
fecting the world cannot be solved at a national level, from global 
warming to the fight against terrorism.  The judicial integration of the 
U.S. in the international legal community is an essential condition of 
soft power tactics for restoring U.S. influence in the world today.  
Under this framework, the U.S. would promote liberal international-
ism to support multilateral cooperation through international organi-
zations such as the Arctic Council, which it recently chaired, by en-
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couraging binding agreements and collective compliance with inter-
national law.  It means adopting a policy pursued by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt282 to embrace great power cooperation within international 
institutions and international law relinquishing the concept of Ameri-
can exceptionalism but emphasizing the model of America as a na-
tion that treats regional hegemonies and all countries as partners, if 
they uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter and other in-
ternational accords.  However, the U.S. would not relinquish its dom-
inant role as a power of last resort when all threads break within the 
liberal world order, and countries usurp territories belonging to other 
nations such as Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and parts of Geor-
gia or Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  In such cases, U.S. strength 
should be implemented through other soft power policies such as 
multilateral sanctions and cyberattacks as a template to stimulate co-
operation concerning China and Russia with the goal of achieving 
consensus about the regional order in their respective theaters. The 
U.S. should seek cooperative engagement with both regional powers 
but respond to provocations with deterrent actions including hard 
power consistent with its security commitments.  Deployment of na-
val assets and American forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
South China Sea are measures of deterrence to raise the costs of fu-
ture perceived aggression by other countries.  Unlike Russian policies 
of aggression violating international law, China has demonstrated its 
“bold” stand to defend its national interests through serious incidents 
in the region including collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese 
vessels and Chinese and Filipino fishing ships in the areas claimed by 
both countries.  China has not shown aggression through military 
force because China still believes in bilateral negotiations as to their 
claims to sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea but refus-
ing to recognize the judgment in the case of The South China Sea 
Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Repub-
lic of China).283  The tactics of soft and hard power do not facilitate 
 
282 Franklin D. Roosevelt: Foreign Affairs, UVA: MİLLER CTR., 
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/fdroosevelt-foreign-affairs (last visited Feb. 25, 
2017). 
283 Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release The South China See Arbitration: The 
Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7. 
76
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/10
2017 RETHINKING EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY 903 
future cooperation as much as they maintain the geopolitical status 
quo with China using coercion instead of multilateral consensus to 
pursue its national interests.  With the U.S. government supporting a 
Joint Maritime Development Regime strategy, the security provid-
ers—specifically the states in the region – would invest the attention 
and resources generated from resolving international maritime dis-
putes as a panacea for improving human security and reducing the 
escalation of tensions in both regions from becoming an international 
crisis. 
Consensus should be the driver of negotiations, and self-
centered politics should be subsidiary as much as possible.  A strong 
body composed of politicians and experts from all parties should be 
in charge to perform a broad range of functions and administer the 
joint regime effectively.  TRNC made two similar proposals for off-
shore cooperation through the UN Secretary General in September 
2011 and September 2012, respectively, which Turkey endorses.284  
The latter proposal, titled the “plan regarding the activities related to 
hydrocarbon resources off the coastlines of the island of Cyprus (both 
North and South),” was to be agreed by both sides “without prejudice 
to their legal and political positions on the Cyprus problem.”285  The 
plan also contains a suggestion that the hydrocarbon resources, ex-
tracted from both sides, be “transported through a pipeline via Tur-
key.”286  The RoC rejected both proposals. 
Could American diplomacy towards the Eastern Mediterrane-
an region be based on more than economic opportunity as suggested 
by Turkey such as transporting hydrocarbons through a pipeline?  
Can American foreign policy embrace not only networks to resolve 
maritime disputes in the region but also human security issues im-
bued with the historical, nationalist, and cultural identities in the re-
gion to end religious intolerance, fight climate change and other eco-
logical threats, stabilize mass migration, eradicate human trafficking, 
and enhance pluralistic forms of government?  Does American for-
eign policy take into account Turkey’s threat perceptions and inter-
ests?  Since congruence of interests is key to a successful alliance, the 
United States must do more to redefine its role by allowing regional 
security dynamics to end regional disputes.  Even after its scheduled 
 
284 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15. 
285 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15. 
286 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15. 
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withdrawal from the Middle East, the U.S. remains an important fac-
tor in the regional balance of power.  The fundamental question re-
mains: What strategy will the U.S. pursue? 
In recent years under former President Obama, a pivot to Asia 
had begun as well as a recalibration in various regions to align Amer-
ican interests with the rise of China and Russia in East Asia, Eurasia, 
and other parts of the world while currently engaging militarily in 
strategic areas of Europe and the Middle East.  The U.S. cannot be 
the global policeman to manage security in all parts of the world.  It 
needs allies.  The recent joint effort of the U.S. and Turkey to fight 
ISIS reflects just such an understanding, for it is based on both an ap-
preciation of Turkey’s stabilizing role in the region and a willingness 
to allow Turkey to assume regional responsibilities.  Although this 
cooperation should not dictate how Ankara defines its priorities, it 
should not be at the price of a country targeting other ethnic groups 
along with ISIS or abusing the principles of democracy and individu-
al liberties.  Furthermore, the U.S. should play a significant role in 
brokering daily issues related to state and human rights security is-
sues by creating a “Joint Maritime Development Regime,” modeled 
after the Arctic Council making the meaning and the advantages of 
an ally dependent on the congruence of interests.  In the past, Turkey 
was an active trans-Atlantic partner in helping contain the threat of 
ethnic nationalism in the Balkans and contributing to the overall sta-
bility of Southeastern Europe.  Turkey was eager to serve as a “pivot-
al” power in assisting the West to gain meaningful access to the 
Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia based on its centuries’ long 
history at the heart of the Ottoman Empire.  The expansion of the 
Western security umbrella to these regions seemed the most efficient 
strategy to stabilize them and ensure their peaceful transitions.  It also 
provided Turkey an opportunity to expand its influence into post-
Soviet geography and implement its foreign policy of Strategic 
Depth.287  However, the U.S. has not pursued a coordinated effort 
with its trans-Atlantic allies to improve the human security in these 
regions due to lack of America’s political will and the thinking that at 
 
287 Joshua W. Walker, Understanding Turkey’s Foreign Policy Through Strategic Depth, 
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least it has undertaken attempts to understand and consider the inter-
ests of potential allies’ interests.  President Erdogan might be more 
receptive if he could expand Turkey’s role as a “pivotal power” by 
endorsing a “Joint Maritime Development Regime” and sort out the 
EEZ claims of other regional states by international law.  With the 
U.S. government partnering with countries in the region in a “Joint 
Maritime Development Regime” strategy, the changing dynamics of 
Turkey’s relations with the West economically, politically and strate-
gically would trigger a new foreign-policy activism throughout the 
Silk Road from China to the Balkans.  Turkey’s role would elevate 
into an increasingly active, capable, and valuable partner and ally in 
resolving the immediate global energy security issues in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and, in return strengthening relations with the West as 
a bulwark against al-Qaeda and ISIL terrorism, Russian expansion-
ism, and anti-Islamism.  Once the civil war in Syria ends, a “Joint 
Maritime Regime” would facilitate peace, prosperity and human se-
curity by opening the door to use the region’s natural resources to re-
build and modernize member states infrastructures, judiciary, econo-
my, social services, and human security.  The Eastern Mediterranean 
region would become a bridge between Europe and the Middle East 
bolstering economic resources as a force for stability and consolidate 
power to protect humanity in terms of human security against disrup-
tive forces.  The region could achieve these goals by adopting mari-
time delimitation approaches to establish the boundaries and jurisdic-
tions of all states in the area as a vital step in developing regional 
cooperation and security with adversarial powers and allies under the 
umbrella of international law. 
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